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A. SOCIAL MEDIA FACILITATED KNOWLEDGE FLOWS  
The advent of Semantic Web, Web 2.0, and Web 3.0 Social Semantic Web has 
presented organizations with a plethora of knowledge flow facilitating collaborative tools 
which if leveraged correctly can dramatically improve readiness, productivity, and 
situational awareness.  The decomposition of knowledge flows remains in its formative 
stages; moreover, social media is an even more recent phenomenon.  The rapid and 
prominent emergence of electronic social networking connects people more readily than 
ever before through asynchronous means.  Private and public organizations alike 
recognize the potential power of these electronic human interactions but largely remain 
sublime in its application.    
As a service, the Marine Corps has invested heavily in the pipes that transfer data 
but the transfer of information and knowledge is still relegated to the formalized and 
structured regimen typical of military organizations. For instance, a unit in the pre-
deployment training phase relies heavily on the daily situation report (SITREP) it 
receives from the unit it is going to replace in the combat theatre. However, the SITREP 
goes through several filters before being released and as a result represents what is 
perceived to be most relevant to the boss and his boss. The information requirements 
differ at each level of the hierarchy and as a result the SITREP does not reflect the subset 
of information or knowledge that would be useful to all levels of the hierarchy.  
Moreover, a unit in the pre-deployment training phase relies on the after action 
reports (AARs) of units in the combat theatre. These structured after action reports are 
also filtered, but more importantly they are not interactive; they only represent a one way 
delivery of information that might be transferred to actionable knowledge providing a 
forum existed within which the topics could be discussed.  Such a forum would give 
context, meaning, and bring the AARs to life.   
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The efficient transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge within an organization can 
yield a distinct competitive advantage to both military and private sector operations. An 
organization that can adapt faster and operates more efficiently has a winning advantage 
over its adversary or competition.  Likewise, a physically and technologically weaker 
enemy that can adapt faster threatens to always be one step ahead. Consider a unit 
conducting distributed operations. The varying elements are adapting to their locales and 
conditions on the ground. They are learning and evolving; however, the means with 
which they can communicate their adaptations to their counterparts is limited. For 
example, consider how much more dangerous the insurgency would be if they maintained 
a means to communicate the knowledge learned in one region to all the insurgents in the 
remainder of the theatre. Their successes in defeating the latest tactic technique and 
procedure (TTP) would be multiplied throughout the theatre eliciting insurgent successes 
faster than can be adapted to.   In analogous form, maintaining an ability to communicate 
the creative measures implemented in adapting to the enemy, ensures that those 
successful TTPs are assimilated more rapidly yielding a comparative advantage, due in 
great part to the sharing and transfer of knowledge.  To this end, the research explores the 
exploitation possibilities and conceptual application of knowledge flow facilitating social 
media intending to develop a competitive advantage through the acceleration and 
facilitation of knowledge flows.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Question  
• Can social media be leveraged to gain operational advantages and training 
efficiencies within and between Marine Corps units conducting pre-
deployment training and executing relief in place operations?  
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2. Secondary Questions   
• What knowledge flow requirements exist within and between units 
conducting pre-deployment training and executing relief in place 
operations?  
• What are the knowledge flow requirement challenges within and between 
Marine Corps units conducting pre-deployment training and executing 
relief in place operations?   
• How can social networking technologies be adapted to facilitate 
knowledge flows within and between Marine Corps units? 
 C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS  
The Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer recently noted that 
leveraging the collective knowledge in inventory of the Department of Defense's 
members was critical to problem solving (Carey, 2010).  Practices that tap into the 
intellectual capital of the whole are indicative of organizations that recognize people and 
what they know as the most important asset the organization can leverage.  The challenge 
has been in how to best facilitate the aforementioned.    
The research establishes a fundamental understanding of knowledge flow and 
social media tenets with the intent of presenting practical solutions capable of being 
implemented today.  Pragmatic knowledge and social media models are derived from the 
fundamentals presented providing a keen understanding of why and how social media 
facilitates knowledge flows.  More importantly, the research demonstrates how these 
social media facilitated knowledge flows are providing realized returns to organizations 
in the private, public, and military sector.    
More specifically the research determines, through the analysis of a Marine Corps 
case study, the applicability of social media to military training and operations, and 
demonstrates the material benefits possible through the conceptual application presented 
herein.  Holistically, the tenets, models, and recommendations made are applicable to the 
spectrum of organizations private and public alike.      
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D. METHODOLOGY  
The research is primarily concerned with determining how social media might be 
leveraged to provide the Marine Corps with a competitive advantage; however, in the 
course of doing so establishes tenets, models, and recommendations that apply to all 
organizations.    
The research first establishes the knowledge and social networking framework 
within which the potential benefits of these social interactions might be qualitatively 
evaluated.  A solid understanding in the foundation of both knowledge flows and social 
media dynamics facilitates understanding how collaborative social media are facilitating 
the private, federal, and military sector knowledge collaborations.  From the tenets 
presented in Chapter I and the social media vignettes described in Chapter III, a 
pragmatic knowledge and social media model is developed and presented in Chapter IV.  
The research then uses the tenets, models, and framework as the backdrop for addressing 
the challenges in the Chapter IV case study.    
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
1. Chapter II:  Knowledge and Social Dynamic Fundamentals  
This chapter presents the literature review associated with the discovery of 
knowledge and social networking dynamics.  The chapter provides a solid understanding 
in the foundation of both knowledge flows and social media dynamics.  The constitutions 
of knowledge and its flows are presented from many points of view in order to 
collectively excise a holistic set of tenets.  Moreover, the examination of social 
interactions is dissected in the second half of the chapter in order to ascertain the social 
dynamics of these exchanges.  This is of particular importance in order to qualitatively 
assess the social media vignettes presented in the following chapter.  
2. Chapter III:  Collaborative Social Media Vignettes  
Presented with a background in knowledge flows and social networking, Chapter 
III presents a cross section of vignettes from a cross section of organizations.  These 
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varying vignettes demonstrate successes and failures in multiple different social media 
formats.  The intent of this chapter is to provide a practical backdrop from which the 
fundamental tenets from Chapter II can be observed in action.  This provides a rich 
appreciation for how social media might be leveraged to facilitate realized gains.  The 
fundamental construct provided in Chapter II and the practical observation of social 
media in this chapter provides the relevance, context, and meaning to the model 
development in Chapter IV.  
3. Chapter IV: Model Development and Case Study Analysis  
Knowledge flow and social media models are developed in this chapter in order to 
construct an all encompassing knowledge flow facilitating social media framework.  
These models are based in part on the fundamentals derived from Chapter II, the 
pragmatic observation of the cross section of vignettes in Chapter III, and the analysis of 
the vignettes.  The developed framework is then applied to the Marine Corps case study 
as a qualitative means of assessing the knowledge flow challenges and how they might be 
addressed through social media.    
4. Chapter V:  Conclusions and Recommendation  
Conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the case study and recommendations 
are presented specifically addressing how social media can be applied to effect readiness, 
productivity, and situational awareness improvements.  Albeit the knowledge flow and 
social media challenges are presented in a Marine Corps specific setting, the challenges 
are the inherently the same challenges experienced by private and public organizations 
alike.  Moreover, the recommendations presented are adaptable to meet the 
organizational needs of non-military related organizations.  The chapter answers the 
questions the research intended to address and provides future work recommendations in 
the fields of quantitative knowledge value added analysis, modeling social network 
analysis, and survey assessment of exemplified successes in social media vignettes - 
specifically elements of the Battle Command Knowledge System.      
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II. KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL NETWORK FUNDAMENTALS 
In order to discuss the potential individual, group and organizational benefits of 
collaborative social networks, there must first be an understanding of the knowledge and 
social media framework within which the benefits of these social interactions will be 
qualitatively evaluated.  A solid understanding in the foundation of both knowledge flows 
and social media dynamics, presented in the first and second half of this chapter 
respectively, facilitates understanding how collaborative social networking services are 
facilitating the private, federal, and military sector knowledge collaborations presented in 
Chapter III .  From the tenets presented in this chapter, and the vignettes described in 
Chapter III , a pragmatic knowledge and social media model is developed and presented 
in Chapter IV, highlighting the manner in which social media facilitated knowledge flows 
benefit the individual, group, and organization.  The end goal is to address the challenges 
in the Chapter IV case study by applying the models founded in the knowledge and social 
media dynamics literature review presented herein.  
A. KNOWLEDGE AS A RESOURCE 
There are many varying views and studies from prominent knowledge 
researchers; however, the one common thread in all views is that knowledge within an 
organization or individual remains an exploitable asset from which an organization could 
potentially gain competitive advantages (Nissen, 2006; Shariq & Vendelo, 2006; 
Snowden, 2005). Discounting a discussion of costs, it is commonly agreed to that the 
transfer of knowledge within an organization from where it exists to where it is needed 
results in value added. Thomas Stewart (1999), author of Intellectual Capital: The New 
Wealth of Organizations notes that "knowledge has become the preeminent resource" and 
that as an economic output both information and knowledge are more important than any 
industrial age product.     
Organizations have invested heavily in knowledge management systems in an 
attempt to both capitalize on its knowledge in inventory and also mitigate the setbacks 
from losing knowledge resident in key personnel (Housel & Bell, 2001).  A 1998 study of 
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European firms by Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler quantified the number of 
companies experiencing severe setbacks from a knowledge drain.  The European firms in 
the study divulged that 50% had experienced serious setbacks resulting from knowledge 
losses due to personnel losses.  Moreover, 13% of the firms reported having realized 
monetary losses as a result of knowledge losses from losing just a single person (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001).   
Research into the knowledge drain being currently experienced by the Los 
Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) following the tragedy of 9/11, highlights the 
importance of knowledge as a resource within an organization; particularly an 
organization whose lack of experience may result in lives lost (Butler, 2010).  In the 
aforementioned case, research suggested that establishing a social collaborative site 
facilitating knowledge flows from personnel planning on retiring and those already 
retired, would provide a means of addressing the inexperienced recruit syndrome the 
LAFD and many other fire departments nationwide were experiencing.  The transfer of 
knowledge from where it exists to where it does not is also observed in life and death 
situations in the private sector as well.  Davenport and Prusak (1998) describe a case 
where the surgical teams of five northern New England medical centers participated in a 
mentoring program meant to transfer knowledge from the experienced to the 
inexperienced.  The results were astonishing.  The participating hospitals collectively 
experienced a 24% reduction in surgical mortality rates (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).   
Leveraging knowledge as a resource in the aforementioned examples is not only critical 
to providing competitive advantage but critical to the survival and efficiency of some 
organizations.       
According to Wickramasinghe (2006), knowledge is not a new concept and 
debates about it predate to classical Greek philosophy, but as Nissen (2006) points out 
"knowledge flow theory is only emerging and beginning to cohere and coalesce"  
(Nissen, 2006).  As a result, different and often times confusing views have emerged  
(Housel & Bell, 2001).  However emerging through the cloud of knowledge flow 
opinions is a single notion that knowledge is the means by which value is created in the  
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information age and remains the single most important resource any organization can 
leverage to seek and maintain competitive advantage  (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Davenport 
& Prusak, 1998; Nissen, 2006; Snowden, 2005). 
B. UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THIS CONTEXT 
A simple explanation for knowledge might be to state that knowledge is that 
which exists within the minds of people (Alavi & Leidner, 2001).  This short concise 
answer is analogous to the explanation commonly provided about metadata:  it is data 
about data.  The explanation would be accurate but far too succinct and superficial to 
provide the context and meaning needed to begin making autonomous inferences. To 
gain an understanding of the context in which knowledge is being discussed herein, a 
grasp of the hierarchy of knowledge is necessary. 
1. The Hierarchy of Knowledge 
A foundation in the hierarchy of knowledge is necessary for understanding the 
models developed in Chapter IV.  The hierarchy of knowledge can be used to 
characterize and provide a framework for the exchanges that occur between people 
(Nissen, 2006).  Transgressing through the hierarchy facilitates the creation of knowledge 
in both its explicit and tacit forms and the components of the hierarchy of knowledge 
facilitate this value creation (Nonaka, 1994).  
 a. Components of the Hierarchy of Knowledge 
Knowledge practitioners who subscribe to the hierarchy of knowledge 
might characterize the succinct explanation of knowledge provided above as a data 
exchange; it lacks any relevance or meaning.  Dretske (1981) and Nissen (2006) note that 
without any further delivery of data or accompanying information, the data received in 
itself has little context or meaning and it alone does not facilitate any action by the 
receiver of said exchange.  Any further exchange providing relevance, meaning, and 
context is considered information.  In this hierarchical characterization of exchanges, data  
 
 10
is converted to information as context and meaning are provided, and knowledge is 
created from information when it is processed in the minds of people  (Nissen, 2006) and 
becomes personalized  (Alavi & Leidner, 2001).    
 The hierarchy of knowledge is described in a 2001 MIS Quarterly article 
and its description is consistent with the knowledge management/knowledge flow 
literature reviewed; the hierarchy of knowledge consists of data, information, and 
knowledge (Alavi & Leidner, 2001).  For semantic purposes, many researchers ascribe to 
the framework of data, information, and knowledge as a means of categorizing the 
myriad examples of exchanges possible between people, and as a means of assigning 
some measure of value to the exchange based on the categorical limitations.  
 Nissen's (2006) knowledge hierarchy model captures the mainstream 
concept of the hierarchy of knowledge, and provides solid footing for understanding the 
learning state model developed in Chapter IV.   Figure 1 provides a pragmatic illustration 
of the data, information, knowledge hierarchy.  The Nissen (2006) model depicts the 
abundance of data and information at its base relative to the lesser amount of knowledge 
at the peak of its hierarchy.  This conforms to the notions prescribed by both Shenk 
(1997), in Data Smog : Surviving the Information Glut, and Alberts, Garstka, & Stein 
(1999), in Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information 
Superiority, that data and information are in great supply in the information age.  The 
pyramidal effect of knowledge atop the model conforms to the notion that knowledge 
expressed in either tacit or explicit forms is in shorter supply  (Davenport & Prusak, 
1998).  Knowledge practitioners largely agree that only about 20% of tacit knowledge has 
been made explicit or shared and the model aptly abstracts this concept (Hansen, Nohria, 
& Tierney, 1999).   The model also provides insight as to how data, information, and 
knowledge facilitate individual, group, or organizations to act.  As exchanges occur 
between communicating parties and the hierarchy of knowledge is transgressed from data 
to information to knowledge, the relative impact of each stage facilitates greater action by 




and knowledge exchanges in both the learning state model and the knowledge model 
presented in Chapter IV have foundations in the concepts presented in the Nissen (2006) 
model in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Knowledge Hierarchy (From Nissen 2006) 
b. Hierarchy of Knowledge Dissention 
Although the description of the hierarchy of knowledge is consistent 
throughout the literature, the relevance of the knowledge hierarchy is contested among 
knowledge practitioners.  Alavi and Leidner (2001) disparage certain views of the 
hierarchy of knowledge, specifically views held largely by the information technology 
community.  Alavi and Leidner (2001) criticize the hierarchical flow of knowledge 
specifically highlighting that "the presumption of  a hierarchy from data to information to 
knowledge with each varying along some dimension, such as context, usefulness, or 
interpretability" misses the grander point that knowledge is simply personalized 
information made unique to the individual possessing the knowledge.   
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 Although Alavi and Leidner (2001) discourage the relevance of the 
knowledge hierarchy in the information technology perspective, other researchers do 
consider it germane to the discussion of knowledge flows.  Nissen (2006) subscribes to 
the relevance of the information technology view of the hierarchy of knowledge.  In 
Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics, he distinguishes between them in great detail and 
establishes the categorical differences as one of his thirty knowledge principles, 
specifically noting: "understanding whether flows of data, information, or knowledge are 
required in a particular situation depends upon what needs to be accomplished (e.g. 
resolving uncertainty, deriving meaning, or enabling action, respectively)" (Nissen, 
2006).  Interestingly enough, Tuomi (1999) also agrees with the relevance of the 
hierarchy of knowledge but with a slight twist.  Tuomi (1999), on the other hand, contests 
the flow of the hierarchy of knowledge.  Tuomi's (1999) perspective on the flow of the 
data, information, knowledge hierarchy is reversed from the Nissen (2006) description, 
and as a result proposes that the direction of the knowledge hierarchy flow is relevant 
because it impacts the manner in which knowledge facilitating information systems are 
developed. 
 Moreover Alavi and Leidner (2001) also suggest that categorizing data as 
just raw numbers or facts bears no relevance to the knowledge framework; however 
Nissen's (2006) characterization of data, wherein he describes data as needing more 
information to gain relevance, implicitly suggests that the introduction of data serves as 
one of several sources igniting the exploratory learning cycle.  The most relevant concept 
however, is that the knowledge hierarchy in and of itself is limiting (Nissen, 2006) in the 
absence of human interaction (Jacobson, 2006).  The depths of the knowledge-learning 
forces and the breadth of the learning transgressed is entirely a people driven affair.  This 
is the reason why Tuomi's (1999) concern of the knowledge  hierarchy flow is irrelevant 
since the information system behind a social networking service is not concerned with 
instantiating explicit or tacit knowledge but facilitating the social interaction of its 
participants (Snowden, 2005).  
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c. Hierarchy of Knowledge Summary 
The varying scholarly opinions are detailed here in order to both present 
dissenting and alternate views, but more importantly to illustrate that the field of 
knowledge management and its instantiation or facilitation in knowledge management 
systems is a relatively new topic akin to the infancy of social networking services 
(Snowden, 2005).  The conflicting views on the knowledge hierarchy prove Housel and 
Bell's (2001) contention that organizations are either stymied or propelled into poor 
knowledge management choices as a result of conflicting knowledge management views.  
 The succinct answer describing knowledge as being that which exists in 
the minds of people might have sufficed if all readers had the same knowledge base from 
which they could draw upon to ascribe the same meaning  (Alavi & Leidner, 2001).  
However as evidenced with the metadata explanation - it is data about data - not all 
readers have the same base of knowledge and as a result not all readers would ascribe the 
same relevance, context, and meaning.  Knowledge practitioners consider these nuances 
very important and parse out the nature of knowledge and the characterization of 
exchanges (data and information) that serve as its stimuli in order to determine how 
knowledge may be facilitated.  Moreover, according to some knowledge practitioners, the 
manner in which knowledge is perceived and the manner in which exchanges are 
characterized drive how a knowledge management information system might be designed 
(Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Tuomi, 1999).   
 Elaborating on the knowledge hierarchy literature review was necessary 
since: (1) it serves as the basis for the learning state model presented in Chapter IV; (2) 
any exchanges between people can be characterized within the hierarchy (Nissen, 2006); 
and (3) it is familiar territory for knowledge practitioners  (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; 
Tuomi, 1999).  A follow on discussion of knowledge being either tacit or explicit is also 
germane to this discussion for: (1) it lays the foundation for the knowledge matrix 
presented in Chapter IV; (2) the tacit-explicit spectrum characterizes the richness, 
difficulty, and value of the exchange (Nissen, 2006; Nonaka, 1994); and (3) it is familiar 
territory for knowledge practitioners (Nissen, 2006; Nonaka, 1995; Snowden 2005).   
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 2. Basic Tenets of Knowledge  
a. Knowledge as Explicit or Tacit  
To gain an appreciation for how social networking services might generate 
value through the facilitation of knowledge flows, it is imperative to grasp Nonaka's 
(1994) concept of knowledge existing along a continuing spectrum from explicit to tacit.  
Von Hippel (1994) characterized tacit knowledge as being 'sticky'.  Since then, 
knowledge practitioners have adhered to the notion of tacit knowledge being 'sticky' as a 
means of describing the difficulty in transferring tacit knowledge from owner to 
recipient.  Tacit knowledge exists along the very top of Nissen's (2006) knowledge 
hierarchy, illustrating that tacit knowledge is less abundant than explicit knowledge 
within the knowledge domain.  One reason for its scarcity is that tacit knowledge is 
considered more difficult to transfer across two points (Nissen, 2006).  Even in person it 
is very difficult to communicate tacit knowledge without taking measures to assist in 
extricating the tacit knowledge from its owner (Snowden, 2005).  Tacit knowledge is 
what exists in the minds of people, made unique by how it was processed, perceived, and 
experienced (Alavi & Leidner, 2001); as a result tacit knowledge is more complex than 
explicit knowledge, explaining why it is less likely to be documented  (Stewart, 1999). 
 Explicit knowledge on the other hand is considered knowledge that has 
been codified, written, or expressed in some tangible form  (Pratt, 2006).  Explicit 
knowledge is considered the easier of the two to transfer between owner and recipient, 
and explicit knowledge is considered easier to store to effect knowledge reuse  (Oshri, 
2006).  Explicit knowledge can be in the form of a codified set of tactical radio 
programming instructions or a pilot's pre-flight pilot checklist.  Explicit knowledge is 
more formalized than its tacit counterpart (Hansen et al., 1999).    
b Relative Value of Data, Information, Explicit and Tacit 
Knowledge 
If basic economic principles are applied, the difficulty and scarcity of tacit 
knowledge makes it a valuable resource; however, Nissen (2006) points out that this is a 
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misnomer.  Knowledge in either tacit or explicit forms do not hold sway over each other.  
Moreover, when referring to the knowledge hierarchy in Figure one, Nissen (2006) points 
out that it is important to observe the "vertical axis of the hierarchy in a value free 
manner."  Knowledge is neither more important than data nor information.  The 
difference in the knowledge hierarchy domains is in how much direct action can be 
applied from the exchange of data, information, explicit or tacit knowledge (Nissen, 
2006).  Tacit knowledge has the greatest potential for facilitating direct action from its 
exchange and as a result organizations inherently place more value on this type of 
exchange (Nissen, 2006).  However, Tuomi (1999) and Nissen (2006) maintain that each 
level of the hierarchy facilitates the other; therefore data, information, and knowledge in 
both its forms should be equally weighted in terms of their facilitative learning capacity.  
c. Knowledge Flows, Transfers, and Sharing 
Knowledge as a whole also has a 'reach' quality which marks a distinction 
in knowledge as either being held by an individual or a collective (Pratt, 2006).  
Moreover, Nissen (2006) purports that this reach quality is incorporated into the notion 
that knowledge has a lifecycle.  He describes that knowledge might be created, organized, 
formalized, shared, applied, and refined.  This lifecycle transpires as knowledge 
transgresses from the individual, to the group, to the organization.  As the tacit 
knowledge made explicit in this process is internalized by the individual, it once again 
becomes personalized and therefore tacit, prompting the start of the lifecycle again.  The 
Nissen (2006) lifecycle bears some resemblance to the Nonaka and Konno (2000) SECI 
model wherein they describe the flow of knowledge as spiraling through socialization, 
externalization, combination, and internalization.   
According to some knowledge practitioners, information technology does 
not facilitate the flow of both explicit and tacit knowledge equally (Nissen, 2006).  Along 
the same perspective, Wickramsinghe (2006) considers knowledge to be either objective 
or subjective.  Using this terminology, explicit knowledge is objective and more easily 
facilitated by information technology (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Wickramsinghe 
(2006) categorizes tacit knowledge as subjective knowledge and like Nissen (2006) 
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declares the instantiation of tacit knowledge in information technology systems difficult 
to do unless it is in the form of expert or virtual systems.  As a result of the inequity in 
how information technology systems facilitate explicit (objective) or tacit (subjective) 
knowledge flows, Ribiere and Roman (2006) suggest that when it comes to knowledge 
management systems, the organization's information technology strategy should reflect 
the knowledge it is meant to facilitate.  Ribiere and Roman (2006) propose organizations 
employ two very different strategies for knowledge flows; Hansen et al. (1999) describes 
these strategies as either codified or personalized.  The former is an explicit knowledge 
flow facilitation strategy and the latter is a tacit knowledge flow facilitation strategy.  The 
balance of the strategic employment varies with the organization and their goals  (Ribiere 
& Roman, 2006; Hansen et al, 1999)  
 Codified knowledge flows are those facilitated most by information 
technology and codified knowledge is advantageous because of its reuse (Ribiere & 
Roman, 2006). Davenport and Prusak (1998) note that the codification of knowledge is 
meant to convert knowledge, "to make it as organized, explicit, portable, and easy to 
understand as possible” (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).  Knowledge made available 
through databases, search and retrieval tools, and knowledge extraction tools are 
considered codified knowledge and resemble the description provided for explicit 
knowledge (Ribiere & Roman, 2006).  Examples of codified knowledge include videos 
from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and 'how to' videos from You Tube.  
There can however be some injection of personalization in codified knowledge flows.   
For example, an Army soldier who is afforded an opportunity to view a CALL video and 
an opportunity to discuss its content with personnel having experienced the depicted 
actions demonstrates a hybrid knowledge flow strategy.  Ribiere and Roman (2006) 
contend that codified and personalized knowledge flows are not diametrically opposed 
strategies but can serve to be supporting actors of both explicit and tacit knowledge 
strategies.  
 Personalized knowledge is people focused and only needs information 
technology as a means of facilitating people dialogues (Ribiere & Roman, 2006).  
According to Ribiere and Roman (2006) tacit knowledge flows are best facilitated by 
 17
linking people through the development of people networks.  Likewise, the former World 
Bank Knowledge Management Program Director, Stephen Denning (2007), champions 
the linking of people to facilitate tacit knowledge flows.  Denning (2007) is well known 
for introducing the power of the narrative at the World Bank and numerous other 
organizations adopting a subjective knowledge strategy.  Moreover, Hansen et al. (1999) 
make the case that a tacit knowledge facilitation strategy is less information technology 
intensive relative to that of a codified knowledge strategy.  The argument is that tacit 
knowledge flows are made possible through the use of people networks, and that these 
people networks are not as information technology intensive relative to the requirements 
of a codified knowledge strategy, e.g. databases and search and retrieval tools.   
 d. Knowledge Transfers 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) state that if an organization wants effective 
knowledge transfers, then all that is needed is "hire smart people and let them talk to one 
another"  (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).  This is a simple explanation that conveys several 
notions.  The knowledge transfer must occur between people that can deliver it and 
absorb it - a knowledgeable person who can provide it and a capable person who can 
receive it.  Moreover, the receiver must not only have cognition of its receipt but must 
also apply the knowledge received before it is considered transferred (Davenport & 
Prusak, 1998).  Moreover, Davenport and Prusak (1998) note that as an organization gets 
larger, the possibility of knowledge existing in one area of the organization and lacking in 
another is more probable, while simultaneously inversely decreasing the likelihood of 
knowing where it exists and being able to navigate to it.   
e. Knowledge Sharing  
King's (2006) description of knowledge sharing as being multi-directional, 
exhibiting informality, and having few rules matches the type of knowledge hierarchy 
exchanges likely to occur on a people network (Snowden, 2005).   This latter description 
of knowledge sharing bears resemblance to the Ribiere and Roman (2006) 
personalization concept.  Davenport and Prusak (1998) depict knowledge sharing in 
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relation to knowledge hoarding.  You are either a provider of knowledge or a receiver of 
knowledge.  Nissen (2006) describes knowledge sharing within his knowledge lifecycle 
model and indicates that knowledge sharing occurs once knowledge has been created, 
organized, and formalized.    
f. Knowledge Flow, Transfer, Sharing Summary 
As Housel and Bell (2001) suggest, the myriad opinions, views,  and 
constructs blur what actions should be taken, but the takeaway here is that tacit 
knowledge flows are generally not considered to be facilitated by information technology 
in and of itself  (Davenport & Prusak, 1998); however, the manner in which tacit 
knowledge flows may be facilitated by information technology is tied to the networking 
of people  (Wickramasinghe, 2006).  The dichotomous split is that while information 
technology, aside from virtual and expert systems, is purported to be ineffective at 
instantiating tacit knowledge flows (Nissen, 2006) it is argued that information 
technology can facilitate them through the formation of people networks (Snowden, 
2005).   
As discussed below, the knowledge constructs framing how well explicit 
or tacit knowledge is instantiated, facilitated, or transferred between entities might not be 
pragmatic enough, and the definitions that have been constructed to frame the knowledge 
concept may be far too limiting; moreover, in the opinion of Snowden (2005) and other 
narrative endorsers (Denning, 2007) these constructs are influencing organizations to 
miss the value in facilitating knowledge flows by other means.   
g. Knowledge Paradigm Shift 
Knowledge in its many forms has been defined in multiple ways: the 
components facilitating the creation of knowledge have been largely defined within the 
knowledge hierarchy construct of data, information, and knowledge (Nissen, 2006; 
Tuomi,1999); the knowledge domain in particular has been further defined by the tacit-
explicit spectrum (Nissen, 2006) and further characterized as having subjective-objective 
qualities respectively (Wickramasinghe, 2006); and knowledge flows have been 
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categorized as either exchanges under the knowledge transfer/knowledge sharing banner  
(King, 2006) or as being codified or personalized (Ribiere & Roman, 2006).  The 
abundant terminology serves to prove Snowden's (2005) precept.  He contends that tacit-
explicit definitions are problematic, consuming, and distracting.  Snowden (2005), who 
founded the Cynefin Centre, and according to Stewart (1999) is an expert in tacit 
knowledge, suggests that the time for parsing explicit and tacit knowledge has passed.  
He warns that limited, rigid, and formalized methods and tools attempting to characterize 
knowledge flows and the natural processes occurring within dynamic human social 
interactions are flawed because they cannot capture the evolving human nature of 
knowledge and learning. He notes:  
That the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, while it 
provided utility as a means of making knowledge a less problematic word, 
is no longer useful, since the concept of tacit knowledge has become 
problematic in turn. We now need to recognise the importance of both 
narrative and concrete knowledge: we always know more than what we 
can say and we will always say more than we can write down.  (Snowden, 
2005)   
Lending support to Snowden's (2005) contention that the human dynamic 
is primarily important, Jacobson (2006) contends that capitalizing on the human 
interactions facilitating the knowledge sharing is a powerful means to leverage the 
organization's human capital.  Wickramsinghe (2006) suggests that instead of relying 
entirely on information technology to exploit the benefits of knowledge flows, a holistic 
approach marrying the people and technology is required for any knowledge creation 
endeavor.  Within their knowledge management strategy diagram listed in Figure 2, the 
Army's Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) captures the very same sentiment 
of adopting a holistic approach by depicting the explicit-tacit pursuit as existing on a 
continuum dependant on the specific goals sought.  
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Figure 2.   Spectrum of Knowledge Strategies (From Battle Command Knowledge 
System) 
C. PEOPLE REMAIN THE CRITICAL COMPONENT 
Although the scholars may differ in their opinion of the relevance and direction of 
the hierarchy of knowledge and in the importance of knowledge being defined as either 
tacit or explicit, the common thread is that people remain the critical component in 
executing knowledge transfers.  Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) note that knowledge within 
an organization cannot be created without individuals and Alavi and Leidner (2001) refer 
to knowledge as being personalized information processed in the minds of people.  
Nissen (2006) indicates that "people play the critical role in flows of data, information, 
and knowledge."  Wickramasinghe (2006) cleverly captures the prominent philosophical 
knowledge conceptualizations of renowned knowledge practitioners Spender (1998), 
Blacker (1995), and Nonaka (1994) in a pragmatic knowledge continuum diagram that 
"underscores … the people-oriented perspective of knowledge creation."  Regardless of 
scholarly position on the hierarchy of knowledge or of academic opinions on how well IT 
can facilitate knowledge flows, people remain the critical component.  An IT system that 
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purports to facilitate knowledge flows without people is less efficient, if effective at all, 
relative to one that has people at its core serving as contributors and recipients of 
knowledge hierarchy exchanges (Jacobson, 2006).   
 Social networks are people driven.  A article by Liebowitz (2007), the first 
Knowledge Management Officer at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Centre, noted that 
facilitating knowledge flows between people "has a critical influence on work and 
innovation… (and) can have a major impact on performance, learning, and innovation."    
The emphasis is that people make knowledge transfers possible and their interaction 
facilitates those flows (Jacobson, 2006).  The common denominator in facilitating 
knowledge flows is the networking of people (Snowden, 2005).   
D. SOCIAL NETWORKS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND KNOWLEDGE FLOWS  
Nelson and Hsu (2006) contend that "social networks and knowledge 
management (KM) are complex, multifaceted phenomena that are as yet imperfectly 
understood.”  Nonetheless, they contend that social networks have sizeable impacts on 
how quickly and effectively knowledge can be both created and disseminated within an 
organization (Nelson & Hsu, 2006). Social media are in a further state of infancy relative 
to the prolific research conducted on social networks through social network analysis  
(Cross, Parker, Prusak, & Borgatti, 2001;  Cross & Parker, 2004); however, as 
Bennington and King note (2010), "the desired end-state of electronic social networks is 
comparable to its traditional counterparts.”  Many of the knowledge practitioners 
referenced thus far support the proposition that the interconnectedness of people facilitate 
knowledge flows (Jacobson, 2006; Liebowitz, 2007; Snowden, 2005).  Moreover, 
research conducted by experts in the management, communication, social psychology, 
and sociology fields have determined that what you come to know is substantially 
impacted by who you know; the efficiency in learning how to solve problems and garner 
information is in direct relation to the personal relationships developed  (Cross et al., 
2001).  Emerging technologies in the form of social media facilitate knowledge learning, 
knowledge creation, and sharing within organizations (Cross & Parker, 2004); examples 
of such cases are presented in Chapter III.  However, in order to establish a qualitative 
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basis for assessing the potential knowledge flow return on investment from collaborative 
social media, it is important to establish the tenets under which a collaborative social 
network might facilitate data, information, and knowledge flows.  From the tenets 
described herein a pragmatic collaborative social network services model is developed in 
Chapter IV.        
1. Facilitating Knowledge Flows in Social Networks and Social Media  
A quantitative study of a firm renowned for its leading edge knowledge 
management investments was conducted by an executive director and research associate 
at the IBM Institute for Knowledge Management in conjunction with two research 
professors, one at Boston College and the other at the University of Virginia's McIntre 
School of Commerce (Cross et al., 2001).  The study concluded with four knowledge 
flow facilitating tenets that drive success in social network endeavors: safety, access, 
knowledge, and engagement nicely captured in the acronym SAKE.   
a. Safety and Trust 
Safety as a measure refers to how well social network relationships make 
it possible to admit a lack of knowledge.  If safety is considered along a spectrum, the 
least safe sites, or least safe relationships between collaborating partners, discourage the 
admittance that someone does not know something (Cross et al., 2001).  According to 
Nelson and Hsu (2006), the greater the expectation that a particular snippet of 
information should be standard knowledge, the safer the relationship needs to be before 
someone will admit they do not know the subject matter.  Therefore, the other end of the 
safety spectrum is a site whose participant relationships openly encourage the 
introduction of what might be otherwise considered asinine questions on a relatively non-
safe site. Snowden (2005) equates this aspect of a relationship as a condition of trust; the 
importance of trust in social networks has been well documented. 
 The emergence of trust in a social network among participants that might 
have never met, but who are nonetheless inherently tied in a community practice, is not 
an immediate phenomena occurring as a result of an information technology initiative 
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(Snowden, 2005).  Trust is a voluntary act that develops over time and as a result of the 
human interactions within the social network (Snowden, 2005).  The notions of trust and 
safety are analogous; whereby both trust and safety address the facilitation of the 
hierarchy of knowledge irrespective of how explicit or commonly known the knowledge 
is within the organization (Nelson & Hsu, 2006).   The significance of this relationship 
tenet is that networks promoting a safe environment facilitate discussion of riskier more 
innovative ideas lending itself to creating knowledge that might otherwise be stifled 
(Cross et al., 2001).    
b. Accessibility 
 An organization can have a plethora of knowledge in inventory, however 
if access to that knowledge, information, or data is not facilitated then that knowledge is 
never applied to solving problems in other parts of the organization (Cross et al., 2001; 
Denning, 2007).  The notion is that the social networks must afford its participating 
members the ability to access the knowledge it needs in a timely fashion (Cross et al., 
2001).  For example a database or share point portal site containing vast amounts of 
explicit knowledge has the potential to be very helpful  (Natarajan & Shekar, 2006) but 
its inaccessibility to all members participating in a community of practice restrains the 
knowledge flow that might have been otherwise facilitated (Cross et al., 2001).  The 
notion that the accessibility of knowledge stores is paramount to facilitating knowledge 
flows is not unique.  An Air Force research paper falling in line with the grander 
Department of Defense 2025 vision notes that the goal is to connect everyone everywhere 
in order to facilitate knowledge stores found within "people, digital libraries, and massive 
interconnected knowledge bases around the world"  (Sikes, Cherry, Durall, Hargrove, & 
Tingman, 1996).  Accessibility of the knowledge stores where they may exist is 
elemental to knowledge flows (Cross et al., 2001).     
c. Knowledge  
 The aforementioned level of accessibility and interconnectedness does not 
imply that more communications, more meetings, and more e-mails are desired or even 
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required; as Cross, Nohria, and Parker (2002) point out the goal should be to facilitate 
accessibility to knowledge stores be that in the form of people or explicit knowledge 
artifacts.  Therefore, awareness of where knowledge exists within the organization is 
crucial to linking people endowed with it, pointing to its sources, or extricating it for 
application or adaptation (Davenport & Holsapple, 2006; Cross et al., 2001).  A social 
network analysis study of knowledge flows among immunologists noted that the 
immunologists within this particular Fortune 250 Pharmaceutical Company were largely 
unaware of each other's knowledge and as a result were unable to bring to bear the stores 
of knowledge housed within the organization (Cross et al 2001).  Denning (2007) of the 
World Bank addressed the issue of knowledge and being aware of what other people 
know.  He established helpdesks that its employees could go to for further referral to the 
stores of knowledge held by people or explicit knowledge artifacts held in data 
repositories.    
(1) Actors, Tie Strength, and Identity. The centrality of actors, 
the strength of ties between them, and the roles within the social network drives how well 
social networks facilitate knowledge flows (Nelson & Hsu, 2006).  The more central an 
actor is in a network the more critical it is for that actor to facilitate knowledge flows 
(Nelson & Hsu, 2006); consider the example of the World Bank and the help desk 
wherein the help desk is an actor with maximum centrality.  The centrality of an actor 
may facilitate knowledge flows as in the World Bank case but also becomes a bottleneck 
for such flows and limits the flattened organizational effect that may come from a 
network with less actor centrality (Cross et al., 2002).    
The Strength of the ties between the actors also has bearing on how 
well tacit or explicit knowledge may flow within the network (Nelson & Hsu, 2006).  
Nelson and Hsu (2006) explain that explicit knowledge is better facilitated by weak ties 
while tacit knowledge flows are better facilitated by strong ties.  Tie strength is 
characterized by the entrenchment of the knowledge sharing partners; entrenchment is 
defined by emotional intensity and length of time of the partnership.  Strong ties are more 
influential and are better capable of conveying complex knowledge, tacit knowledge, but 
they are also more stubborn to innovation and change.  These relationships also require 
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less brokerage - persons that can facilitate the knowledge flow between two parties.  On 
the other hand weak ties require lots of human interaction to facilitate the knowledge 
flows.    
Snowden (2005) argues that a social network is better served by 
adopting an 'identity' with a unifying purpose.  This moves away from an individualistic 
social network relationship to one of a group with a coalescence of purpose (Snowden, 
2005).  In such a setting the limitations observed with the strength of ties might be 
overcome.    
d. Engagement in a Collaborative Social Network Site  
Nissen (2006) proposes that a knowledge owner must be competent and 
knowledgeable for sharing to be effective.  Likewise, Jacobson (2006) points out that the 
receiver must also be equally competent to absorb the shared knowledge.  Therefore, the 
case is made that knowledge sharers should have a shared baseline of expertise and 
education similar to those found in communities of practice (Coakes & Clarke, 2006).  In 
addition the individual endowed with the knowledge must also be willing to share the 
knowledge (Cross & Parker, 2004) and the recipient must be motivated to want to acquire 
the knowledge.  Knowledge sharing is then influenced by the motivations to share 
(Nelson & Hsu, 2006) and by the ability to acquire and absorb.   
(1) Motivations to Engage in Knowledge Sharing.  Motivations 
to share knowledge may be altruistic, driven by Maslow's hierarchy of needs, or have 
other compensation mechanisms (Nelson & Hsu, 2006).  Davenport and Prusak (1998) 
describe how British Petroleum motivates its employees to engage in knowledge sharing 
by presenting an annual "Thief of the Year" award recognizing the person that has stolen 
the best ideas.  Moreover, Texas Instruments awards a "Not Invented Here, But I Did It 
Anyway" award as a means of motivating employees to acquire knowledge by sharing 
knowledge inside and outside the firm (Jacobson, 2006).    
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e. Knowledge Facilitation through Social Media Narrative  
Denning (2007), former World Bank Knowledge Management Program 
Director, has championed the power of the narrative to convey knowledge flows.  He has 
told the following story of a Zambia health worker accessing the World Wide Web: 
 In June of last year, a health worker in a tiny town in Zambia went to the 
Web site of the Centers for Disease Control and got an answer to a 
question about the treatment of malaria. Remember that this was in 
Zambia, one of the poorest countries in the world, and it was in a tiny 
place six hundred kilometers from the capitol city. But the most striking 
thing about this picture, at least for us, is that the World Bank isn’t in it. 
Despite our know-how on all kinds of poverty-related issues, that 
knowledge isn’t available to the millions of people who could use it. 
Imagine if it were. Think what an organization we could become.  (Phoel, 
2006) 
Phoel (2006) notes that the story does several things:  (1) it conveys the 
power of the narrative; (2) it conveys the power of knowledge management; and (3) 
conveys the power of interconnecting people to facilitate knowledge flows (Phoel, 2006).  
According to Phoel (2006), Denning had unsuccessfully attempted to convey the same 
point through the use of business language: statistics, models, and power points.  Instead 
the narrative above successfully conveyed the message and motivated the World Bank 
audience to action (Denning, 2007).    
The founder of the IBM's Cynefin Center argues that the narrative needs 
to play a more central role in knowledge flows (Snowden, 2005).  In 1998 Davenport and 
Prusak noted that if an organization wanted to effect knowledge transfers then it should 
simply increase the dialogue opportunities within its organization to reduce the gaps of 
knowledge from where they existed to where they were needed; however, they also noted 
that this gap increased as the organization's size increased simply because it was harder to 
effect dialogues on a grand scale or through large geographic disbursement.  However, 
since 1998 there has been a paradigm shift with respect to how easily people can be 
interconnected through the use of myriad social media (Rees & Hopkins, 2009).  The 
Army has recognized the power in exploiting social media to facilitate the narrative in  
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order to affect knowledge transfers and knowledge sharing; the following is an excerpt 
from the Army's Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) capturing the 
aforementioned points:  
The Army understands this and uses stories or vignettes in its major field 
manuals to help transfer thoughts, concepts, values or competencies. 
Storytelling can impact critical processes, including: knowledge creation, 
sharing and exploitation; building and integrating individual, team and 
organizational expertise; leadership and leader development; improving 
situational awareness, organizing and articulating perception, 
interpretation and actionable prediction in an operational environment.  
BCKS' success with digital storytelling has far reaching implications for 
knowledge transfer across the Army enterprise and should be included in 
any leader's knowledge management "toolkit."  (U.S. Army, 2010) 
2. Social Network Conditions and Culture 
a. Top Down Ignition and Bottom Up Emergence  
Snowden (2005) argues that top level management should set the 
conditions, in effect stimulate the start of the social network but it should allow for the 
network to emerge and grow on its own.  This way, the management can allow "novel 
and desirable emergent phenomena … be nurtured, while undesirable ones can be 
detected early and either destroyed or influenced so that they self destruct" (Snowden 
2005).    
b. Organizational Culture  
Cross et al. (2002) point out that a common myth that top level 
management cannot do much to assist the development of informal networks.  However 
they notes that top management can ensure that the formal hierarchical structure existing 
in the physical organization is not also mirrored in the social network.  Such networks 
defeat the purpose of facilitating knowledge flows because they lose their flexibility 
(Cross et al., 2002).  Moreover, top management can also influence the appropriate 
culture.  If the organization is adept at knowledge hoarding vice knowledge sharing, then 
management can enact changes that motivate a sharing culture (Cross et al., 2001).  
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Lastly, management can also influence the culture by prizing collaborative work and 
praising those endeavors over individual accomplishments.  The former encourages a 
sharing culture whereas the latter encourage behavioral norms that discourage the sharing 
of knowledge.    
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III. COLLABORATIVE SOCIAL MEDIA  
The chapter intends to demonstrate through the presentation of private and public 
sector collaborative social networking examples, how social media are being leveraged to 
provide access to myriad sources of information, enhancing the participants' learning and 
understanding, thereby benefitting the individual and organization.   The social media 
examples presented satisfy one or more of the aims Davenport and Prusak (1998) set out 
for knowledge management projects. They make the knowledge clumped in one disparate 
location visible in another and provide context for its role in the organization, in large 
part by establishing a knowledge learning culture promoting knowledge sharing, all due 
to the web of collaborations made possible by the knowledge infrastructure whose 
conditions were set to encourage a web of connections  (Nelson & Hsu, 2006).   
 The high failure rate of IT initiatives and the numerous cases of IT systems 
purporting to instantiate tacit knowledge has raised the level of skepticism with respect to 
how well IT can be leveraged to provide organizational knowledge value added  (Housel 
& Bell, 2001).  A review of the knowledge management and knowledge flow literature 
reveals a general consensus among knowledge practitioners that the terms information 
and knowledge sharing, along with other similar terminology, have been abused and can 
be a bit of a misnomer  (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Housel & Bell, 2001; Nelson & Hsu, 
2006; Nissen, 2006; Snowden, 2005). 
In many instances, information sharing has summed up to share point portals 
serving as repositories of documents that may have some explicit value.  However, 
finding a snippet of information in a data repository might leave the recipient of said data 
with words that have little context (Nissen, 2006).  However, if this document repository 
was also tied or inherently part of a social networking collaborative medium, and the 
capability to query or be inquisitive about the data at hand existed within the structure of 
the service, then knowledge flows as described in Chapter II could be facilitated  
(Greaves & Mika, 2008).   
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 Moreover, the rapid pace with which electronic collaborative social media are 
progressing leaves a trail of terms associated with the Semantic Web, Web 2.0, or Web 
3.0 Social Semantic Web (Greaves & Mika, 2008; Rees & Hopkins, 2009).  Among the 
many terms associated with the aforementioned technological domains includes but is not 
limited to: blogs and podcasts; wikis and other collaborative spaces; social networks such 
as Facebook and LinkedIn; other user generated content; virtual social environments; 
mashups; instant message and chat (Rees & Hopkins, 2009).  In an effort to eliminate 
limiting semantic constructs, other restrictive interpretations, and remain relevant through 
future technological offspring, the Rees and Hopkins (2009) approach is adopted in 
referring to any of the aforementioned, and any future system manifestation of 
collaborative social capabilities as social media systems or social networking systems. 
 The social media system examples provided herein exhibit the elemental 
processes Nonaka (1994) identifies as necessary precursors to knowledge creation: they 
make possible the socialization of knowledge; they facilitate both the internalization and 
externalization of knowledge; and allow for autonomous inferences to be created through 
the combination of the knowledge in inventory and the knowledge in motion  (Nelson & 
Hsu, 2006; Nissen, 2006).  The thread transgressing through this communal interaction is 
that the mechanisms for learning are facilitated by the linkages in the social media web.  
It becomes more than just shuttling information around computers; a problem Nissen 
(2006) warns is common in knowledge management systems.  The overreliance on IT has 
missed the critical people component, and has in large part failed to exploit the 
knowledge enhancement opportunities in employee networks in a way that could lead to 
explosive individual and organizational performance improvements  (Nelson & Hsu, 
2006; Parker, Cross, & Walsh, 2001).    
 A. XEROX  
 1. Knowledge Management Domains 
 The people driven nature of social networking is in part what makes the 
knowledge exploitation potential so attractive.  By the mid 1990s, after failing to 
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capitalize on early inventions coming from its Palo Alto Research Center (Housel & Bell, 
2001), Xerox sought to develop a means for its employees to share their knowledge 
capital.  A 1999 Management Review article referenced a case study of Xerox's 
knowledge management systems noting that 80% of its IT was focused on adapting to the 
social dynamics of its workplace environment (Hickins, 1999; Nelson & Hsu, 2006).  
Their effort in 1996 began with a collaborative effort with "Ernst & Young, the American 
Productivity & Quality Center, and Boston University" to develop a library of case 
studies which could be analyzed for knowledge management commonalities.  The study 
revealed 10 domains of knowledge management (Powers, 1999).    
1. Sharing knowledge and best practices 
2. Instilling responsibility for knowledge sharing 
3. Capturing and reusing past experiences 
4. Embedding knowledge in products, services, and processes 
5. Producing knowledge as a product 
6. Driving knowledge generation for innovation 
7. Mapping networks of experts 
8. Building and mining customer knowledge bases 
9. Understanding and measuring the value of knowledge 
10. Leveraging intellectual assets  
Xerox's director of corporate strategy in 1999 indicated that the knowledge 
management system they developed was active in only seven of the domains while other 
companies like Chevron were only active in best practices (Powers, 1999).  
 2. Eureka & Amber Web  
Based off its findings in 1996, Xerox forged a long rage 'Xerox2005' plan that 
among other things sought to leverage knowledge through collaborative people driven 
social systems (Powers, 1999). Among its early successes was the Eureka initiative.  
Common to many of the social networking successes discovered in the literature review, 
Eureka was an effort to share and reuse intellectual capital by facilitating its 25,000 
worldwide service technicians to share their non-textbook repairs (Powers, 1999).  Xerox 
in essence created a service technician community of practice.  Prior to the Eureka effort, 
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technicians could only learn of new repair techniques from other technicians in their 
immediate physical circle (Gordon, 2010).  In the absence of any collaborative medium, 
repairs were largely done based off of experience, innovative repair solutions learned 
around the proverbial water cooler, or completed per the service manual instructions 
(Powers, 1999).  With an approximate one million service calls per month performed by 
over 25,000 technicians, a tremendous untapped knowledge in inventory existed 
organization wide.    
As Mottl (2001) notes,  many scenarios the service technicians experienced 
weren't found in "training books, documents, or vendor updates"; however that is not to 
say that the problem had not already been experienced somewhere else in the 
organization (Powers, 1999).  Dan Holtshouse, Xerox director of corporate strategy and 
Xerox knowledge initiatives at the time, provided an example of a problem-solution 
scenario that occurred between a Toronto and Brazilian service technician.  The Brazilian 
service technician, stumped for a repair solution not previously codified or experienced 
within his region, queried the knowledge sharing site with the repair problem; his initial 
course of action after exhausting all locally known solutions was to replace the $40,000 
Xerox printer altogether.  To his surprise, a Toronto technician had experienced the same 
problem on the same model and communicated that the repair issue would be solved by 
installing a connector device (Gordon, 2010; Powers, 1999).  By some accounts, the 
connector cost only 90 cents (Powers, 1999) and by others it cost $90 (Gordon, 2010); 
notwithstanding the discrepancy in the cost of the connector, this success story was 
commonplace as a result of the collaborative social media site (Gordon, 2010; Powers, 
1999).       
Gordon (2010) who served numerous positions within Xerox, among them as 
Senior Director and General Manager of Outsourcing Services, provides a personal tale 
of how the Eureka project was almost cancelled after investing millions in a smart 
artificial intelligence database not achieving the desired results.  The collaborative portal 




service technicians were neither providing tips nor solutions, nor were they exploiting the 
very expensive tool with the voraciousness expected by Xerox executives and Palo Alto 
Researchers (Gordon, 2010).   
 Breaking from the norm, Xerox leveraged anthropologists to examine the 
behavior of the blue collar service technician work force, and determined that the 
organizational culture had to change (Gordon, 2010).  Brown (2000), former chief 
scientist and director of the Palo Alto Research Center, recalls anthropologists concluding 
that although management frowned on service technicians when they socialized on 
company time, it was during these periods of socialization that the most valuable work 
was being accomplished; "the tech reps were not just repairing machines; they were co-
producing insights, and observations through language and rituals to explain how to 
repair the machine better, and faster" (Gordon, 2010).  The collaborative social media 
offered an opportunity to virtually socialize and receive recognition for their ingenuity; 
however, the ability to be recognized was not a part of the original design and therefore 
the impetus for motivating the collaboration was missing (Gordon, 2010).   
Three months after redesigning the site to account for Maslow's top hierarchical 
needs Xerox's efforts yielded success (Gordon, 2010).  Stimulus for the site had come top 
down and growth of the site was bottom up (Powers, 1999).  The organization adjusted 
the site to allow for peer recognition; the ability "to tell stories on how to fix things based 
on personal experiences and allow fellow peers to reaffirm the practice explained or 
augment with additional insight—like Wiki Encyclopedia, but with a thumbs up and 
thumbs down counting system" (Gordon, 2010).  Facilitating knowledge flows from 
where they existed to where they were needed resulted in a 5-10% parts and labor cost 
reduction (Powers, 1999).  To date, 95% of the technicians access the knowledge sharing 
site daily, resulting in an annual cost savings of $30 million; this is all directly attributed 
to the knowledge sharing site the technicians so avidly use (Gordon 2010).        
Xerox's initial success with Eureka prompted the creation of a second social 
media collaborative site.  This site however adhered to an even more informal structure; 
Xerox's scientists were the audience of Xerox's second Web-based social media 
collaboration (Powers, 1999).  In an attempt to remedy the issues that contributed to 
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Xerox missing out on the innovations created at the Palo Alto Research Center, the 
collaboration site was established in order to allow the scientists to collaborate amongst 
themselves.  The resulting knowledge sharing collaboration was termed Amber Web and 
later became known as the collaboration tool sold on the market under the brand name 
DocuShare (Powers, 1999; Velker, 1999).    
The anthropological lessons learned from the Eureka project were applied to 
Amber Web.  Scientists needed a less regimented social gathering place that allowed a lot 
more freedom in the maintenance and regulation of the space (Powers, 1999).  Speaking 
in reference to the social space, Holtshouse was quoted as saying "no one runs it or 
specifically controls it" (Velker, 1999).  As a result the site required little maintenance; 
only one administrator tended to the site for a third of the work day.  Moreover, unlike 
the millions spent on the Eureka project, Amber Web was able to be deployed for much 
less.   
Once it was converted into a software product line item branded DocuShare, it 
was able to be deployed for $15 - $45 thousand depending on the scale of the 
deployment.  The site's success is marked by more than just the ability to market it as a 
product, since its introduction the site grew from 500 research engineers to over 30,000 
employees (Powers, 1999).  Moreover, the site has grown to include more than just 
scientists; it now also includes engineers, product designers, business planners, and 
marketers.  The collaboration of multiple functional areas has allowed for greater returns 
to the organization; product designers and business planners now share ideas, approaches, 
and knowledge on the communal site (Powers, 1999; Velker, 1999).  Moreover, Xerox's 
former senior management attribute Xerox's high retention rates to the employee 
empowerment made possible through its social media (Gordon, 2010).    
B. TOSHIBA  
In August 2009, Toshiba launched a Web 2.0 social media site intended to capture 
the 80% of organization's knowledge not already made explicit in documents (Toshiba 
America Business Solutions Inc., 2009).  The social media site was borne from a need to 
tie in multiple functional areas into a single communal space in order to share knowledge 
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on best practices and facilitate end-user generated knowledge.  The Toshiba eXCHANGE 
site was intended to make possible many of the same functions found now on popular 
social networking sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, and YouTube.  Specific tools 
included: an online member presence allowing voluntary direct connection; 
organizational blogs; organizational video content; feedback mechanisms allowing users 
to rate content on a value basis; really simple syndication (RSS); (Wiki); and intelligent 
search engines facilitating information location (Toshiba America Business Solutions 
Inc., 2009).    
With the internal deployment of the social media application, Toshiba intended to 
increase communications throughout its organization tying in disparate locations.  Their 
hope was that the introduction of a collaborative social media site would reduce their 
sales cycle providing a competitive edge (Toshiba America Business Solutions Inc., 
2009).  Toshiba was recognized for its innovation in August of 2010 by the independent 
Business Equipment Research and Test Laboratories (BERTL) for developing a product 
that was expected to shape the manner in which business operated within the next couple 
of years (Halid05, 2010). 
C. MENTORSHIP AND VIRTUAL LEARNING  
Not all knowledge management social media initiatives have yielded promise.  As 
indicated by Housel and Bell (2001), the field of knowledge management remains in its 
infancy, and the manner in which some organizations have attempted to leverage 
technology to facilitate knowledge flows is often done on outdated assumptions or 
attempted in incompatible organizational cultures.  The previous examples illustrated 
successful collaborative social media initiatives book-ending a decade, demonstrating 
that successful social media examples are not recent phenomena.  On the other hand the 
following two examples present recent social networking and social media case studies 
that either failed or had significant challenges; one is based on a well-known traditional 
application and the other on cutting edge social media technology.    
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1. E-mail Mentoring  
In 2007, Allied Health attempted to implement an e-mail mentoring system in 
order to provide the support and professional development necessary to maintain its 
nursing and other health staff clinically current.  Before launching a fully fledged e-mail 
mentoring system, a pilot study was conducted; the pilot study was also the subject of a 
case study.  The mentoring system meant to address certain areas of concern, specifically: 
retention and recruitment, and professional isolation due to geographical dispersion.     
The study intended to observe the benefits of the exchanges by comparing the 
control group with the experimental group; wherein, the former was not mentored while 
the latter was mentored. The volunteers were matched one on one in mentor-mentee 
fashion.  The goal of the pilot study was to assess if the mentored group experienced 
greater satisfaction and reduced stress relative to the group that was not mentored.  The 
metric analysis never came to fruition since the e-mail mentoring initiative broke down 
after only six months into a one year planned study.    
Although the collaborative mentorship initiative failed to take hold, Stewart 
(2009) points out the takeaways.  The participants largely desired the mentorship; 
however, dedicating time to the endeavor was an issue.  Moreover, the participants in 
both the mentor-mentee roles lacked the motivation to frequently conduct mentorship 
engagements.  On average, the participants only communicated four times a month with 
some not doing so at all.  Stewart (2009) concluded that the one on one mentorship was 
not conducive and that "a community approach to mentoring using open social 
networking tools spreads the mentoring 'load' and allows the mentee to have more than 
one perspective on an issue, and increases the access to knowledge and networking 
opportunities."  Moreover, the case for social media was made because it also provided 
support for key roles, e.g., mentor to mentor.  Additional relevant reasons were also 
pointed out, among them:  poor computer skills, lack of understanding online mentoring 
context, and trust challenges in accepting a long distance mentor relationship    
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3. Virtual Simulation   
On the other end of the technological spectrum was the use of the virtual 
environment Second Life to educate student midwives in training. Knowledge 
practitioners have stated that sticky tacit knowledge flows are best facilitated through 
expert systems and virtualization (Housel & Bell, 2001; Nissen, 2006).  Spurred by the 
latter, an 18-month virtualization project was undertaken in New Zealand in 2007 using 
Second Life to examine how learning might be enhanced in a multiuser virtualized 
learning environment simulating several stages of the midwife process.  Designed as a 
social networking environment, Second Life was chosen as the platform of choice 
because it was considered the most stable of the virtual environment platforms (Winter, 
2010).   The Second Life Education In New Zealand group (SLENZ) simulated the 
midwife role from the receipt of a patient phone call going into labor through the first 
hour following birth of the child.  Collaborative learning was facilitated by mentorship, 
meeting with experts and conducting discussions, undergoing tutorial sessions, and 
engaging in pairs and role playing the birthing scenario.     
The final evaluation report provided mixed results.  Although the virtualized 
environment was able to produce unique experiential learning situations and facilitated 
social networking cross-cultural collaborative problem solving, the entire evolution was 
hamstrung by technical difficulties and user resistance to the new learning environment 
(Winter, 2010).  The technical issues experienced due to bandwidth limitations and high-
end terminal equipment hardware requirements overshadowed the knowledge gain 
successes some of the participants reported (Winter, 2010).    
Although the aforementioned virtual simulation did not produce the collaborative 
knowledge flows desired, there are examples of successful explicit and tacit knowledge 
creating virtual environments.  One such example is the Tactical Language and Culture 
Training System (TLCTS).  TLCTS marries artificial intelligence in a virtual 
environment in order to model the decision-making process; moreover it brings to bear 
automated speech recognition with feedback mechanisms aiding the system to learn and 
account for dialects and accents (Johnson & Valente, 2009).  As reported in a 2009 issue 
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of AI Magazine, the primary function of the DARPA funded system is to facilitate 
language and cultural skills learning in order to complete specific tasks (Johnson & 
Valente, 2009).  The system has been employed by Marine Corps and Army units 
conducting combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The system has the potential to be 
used as a team building tool, e.g., special operations team collectively working together 
speaking tactical Pashto with local leaders; however, this level of social collaboration has 
not been widely used because of the intensive bandwidth terminal end equipment 
restrictions.  Nonetheless, units that have adopted the system have had great success in 
both retaining the language and culture training and more importantly saving lives.  Third 
Battalion, Seventh Marines (3/7 Marines) mandated two members of each squad to 
undertake 40 hours of training on the system (Johnson & Valente, 2009).  The participant 
surveys and officer interviews attribute the unit not experiencing a single casualty in part 
to the benefits gained from the TLCTS training (Johnson & Valente, 2009).   
D. GRASSROOTS MENTORING COMMUNITIES  
Virtualization and artificial intelligence systems can be costly endeavors.  In 
2009, TLCTS research was estimated to have been $5 million with an additional $1 
million to make it a deployable system; moreover, each new course development is 
approximately $300,000 - $600,000 (Johnson & Valente, 2009).  The enterprise 
deployment costs of a system like DocuShare is estimated at $45,000 (Powers, 1999).  
However examples of social media with much more humble beginning are abound.    
Sites like SmallWarsJournal.com, ProfessionalSoldiers.com, SailerBob.com, 
Airwarrior.com, and the NavalInstitute.org are being established at the grass roots levels 
and hosting discussions on a range of professionally enhancing issues to those in the 
military profession  (Dixon, 2007; Dixon, Allen, Burgess, Kilner, & Schweitzer, 2005; 
Small Wars Journal, 2009).  These sites are a popular medium for officers and enlisted to 
share knowledge and seek mentorship (Long & Schweitzer, 2004).  Senior military 
officers comment and write about topics that might be expected in a professional military 
journal; the following are some of recent and interesting topics:  
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o Rebuilding the Force Unconventional Advisory Forces in 
Counterinsurgency  (Small Wars Journal, 2009) 
o Fighting for a Narrative:  A Campaign Assessment of the US-led 
Coalition's (Small Wars Journal, 2009) 
o Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan (Small Wars 
Journal, 2009) 
o Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America (Small Wars Journal, 
2009) 
Some of these commercial sites are used by military Public Affairs to pass on 
information of interest to the community.  For example on AirWarrior.com, an Air Force 
public affairs official posted an article on the new combat systems officer course opening 
in Pensacola (Severns, 2010).  Furthermore, on the NavalInstitute.org site a Marine Corps 
Captain with the 15th MEU posted a personal account of the Magellan ship pirate 
takedown operation he participated in the day prior to his posting (Martin, 2010).  The 
value in these sites has not gone unnoticed by the federal sector.  
E. FEDERAL SECTOR  
The Chief Performance and Management Deputy Director for the Office of 
Management and Budget was quoted in a Federal News Radio interview as stating that 
"the federal government missed out on the productivity boom that transformed the private 
sector over the past two decades" (Galagan, 2010).  The Deputy Director's comments are 
substantiated when one observes the 139 days on average it requires the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development to hire someone, the 160 days a veteran must wait 
on average before receiving benefits, and the three years it takes to have a patent request 
processed (Galagan, 2010).  Moreover following Cyber Shock Wave, a cyber defense 
exercise held to test the nation's response to a cyber attack, participant and former 
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff further pointed out that the nation lacked 
the social media collaborative spaces necessary for government and private sector cyber-
defenders to share knowledge and best practices.  Such a resource would improve the 
nation's cyber defense posture (Starks, 2010).    
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Intelink, which houses Intellipedia, is a well-known site among intelligence 
practitioners.  Its host of social media collaborative resources provides a space for its 
vastly spread network of users to learn, collaborate, and share through the use of picture, 
video, and document sharing (Galagan, 2010).  Intellipedia, a subset of Intellink, is 
modeled after Wikipedia and provides a similar Wiki experience, except here a user can 
access classified and unclassified material, post what they know, and if authorized make 
changes to intelligence material on the site.  This capability represents a tremendous 
leveraging of human capital given that the site has over 250,000 users (Galagan, 2010).    
In the fall of 2010, the Government Services Agency (GSA) is planning on 
debuting 'FedSpace' (Galagan, 2010).  Unlike many previous federal uses of social media 
as a public affairs venue for reaching out to the public, FedSpace is branded as being 
designed 'for feds by feds' (Galagan, 2010).   The goal for FedSpace is to provide a space 
for sharing best practices and knowledge, allow for project collaboration, support 
communities of interest, and allow user generated content.   FedSpace was in part driven 
by the administration's Open Government Memorandum and Open Government 
Directive; it will in essence establish a federal enterprise intranet bridging the gap 
between varying agency resources not currently visible to each other.  The debut of 
FedSpace illustrates how the federal government is attempting to capitalize on its vast 
knowledge resources (Galagan, 2010).    
NASA describes Spacebook as an enhanced intranet serving as yet another 
example of efforts being made to capitalize on knowledge in inventory within the public 
sector (White House, 2009).  Spacebook provides NASA personnel and NASA 
contractors the means to learn through their connections to each other.  In Facebook type 
fashion, its users can create "their own pages where they can publish their own status, 
share files, connect with others, follow other's activity, and join communities of interest"  
(White House, 2009).  NASA believes that science discovery cannot be left alone to 
individual endeavors but must be nurtured with a constant flow of ideas that coalesce into 
new ideas (White House, 2009).  These creative ideas are not physically bounded to one 
local area.  A collaborative site that provides the means of connecting disparate  
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intellectual minds and equips them with the capability of publishing user generated 
content, provides the social collaborative space the elasticity to flex with the evolving 
needs of its socially dynamic users  (White House, 2009).   
The aforementioned federal examples of social media initiatives demonstrate 
initiatives prompted top down; however the Army provides an example of a grass roots 
social media endeavor that became so successful in providing mentorship that it was 
formally adopted by the Army, brought under the Army's .mil domain, and served as the 
impetus to their formidable knowledge management system (Dixon, 2007).    
F. ARMY BATTALION COMMAND KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM  
In the spring of 2000, a group of Army officers spurred by the desire to create a 
social media site where former and present company commanders could find mentorship, 
advice, and professional development created CompanyCommander.com (Dixon, 2007; 
U.S. Army, 2010).  This professional forum served as the impetus to the creation of the 
Army's Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS).  The company commander 
community of practice was considered a knowledge rich environment, teaching leaders to 
be effective leaders in a demanding and rapidly changing battle environment (Dixon et 
al., 2005).  The knowledge exchanges observed on the site were wide ranging, but at the 
heart were conversations about topics that truly mattered to the company commanders:  
‘How do I deal with the death of a soldier I am responsible for?’ ‘Is it my 
responsibility to help soldiers be comfortable with the reality of killing or 
just train them to do it?’ ‘How do I keep soldiers physically fit for the 
mountainous terrain and overwhelming heat and cold of Afghanistan?’ 
‘What have we learned about how to interact with Iraqis?’  (Dixon, 2007)  
Schweitzer, an Army military officer and co-founder of  
CompanyCommander.com, points out that leadership cannot be summed up in doctrine 
and is abound in ambiguous aspects that can be aided by peers whose experiences can be 
profoundly deepening environment (Dixon et al., 2005; Long & Schweitzer, 2004).  The 
Army leadership became acutely aware of the organizational value that could come from 
providing the conditions for a rich exchange of ideas and experiences.  The BCKS site 
boasts that the Army is on the forefront of getting knowledge from soldiers who have it to 
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those that need it by "combining people, processes, and technology to help soldiers share 
what they know, solve problems, and grow professionally" (U.S. Army, 2010).    
The Army's Digital Stories section has wholeheartedly adopted the power of the 
narrative through story telling; Figure 3 serves as a powerful example of the Army's 
Battle Command Knowledge System marries social media technology with human social 
dynamics to affect knowledge transfers.  “Digital Story Telling is a KM process that 
applies 'narrative engineering' capabilities to enhance tacit knowledge transfer… the 
'Breakdown'  video provides an example of using digital storytelling to transfer several 
key training points, including: training and leader shortcomings, maintaining personal 
relationships with others, and the importance of cultural awareness in a 
counterinsurgency environment" (U.S. Army, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.    Army Narrative Engineering (From U.S. Army) 
Moreover, the digital story telling board is not a single knowledge artifact existing 
on its own; it is tied into the slew of other communities of practice that have since been 
started inside the Army's Battle Knowledge  Management System.  As Long and 
Schweitzer (2004) point out, these communities of practice have facilitated further 
refinement of the knowledge learned through the digital stories by tapping into the 
experience of the collective.  In 2009 the Army had over 150,000 members participating 
in over 60 forums (U.S. Army, 2010).  Since adopting CompanyCommander.com from 
its commercial maternal mother, the Army has published its first knowledge management 
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directive (U.S. Army, 2010).   In it they list the Army’s knowledge management guiding 
principles and the seven major objectives of the Army knowledge system (U.S. Army, 
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IV. KNOWLEDGE, SOCIAL MEDIA MODELS AND CASE 
STUDY ANALYSIS 
 Emerging technologies in the form of social media facilitate knowledge learning, 
knowledge creation, and sharing within organizations (Cross et al., 2001); examples of 
such cases were presented in Chapter III. However, in order to establish a qualitative 
basis for assessing the potential knowledge flow return on investment from collaborative 
social media, it is necessary to establish a pragmatic knowledge and social media model 
that can be applied to the case study presented herein.  
From the tenets presented in Chapter II and an analysis performed herein of the 
vignettes described in Chapter III, a pragmatic knowledge and social media model is 
developed and presented in this chapter. The models are intended to highlight the manner 
in which social media facilitated knowledge flows benefit the individual and 
organization. The end goal is to address the challenges in the case study by applying the 
models founded in the knowledge and social media dynamics literature review.  
 A. DEVELOPING THE LEARNING STATE MODEL 
 Returning to an earlier explanation of knowledge in which it was stated that 
knowledge is that which exists within the minds of people (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). This 
short concise answer is analogous to the explanation commonly provided about metadata: 
it is data about data. The explanation would be accurate but far too succinct and 
superficial to provide the context and meaning needed to begin making autonomous 
inferences. However short, succinct, and incomplete the initial explanation of knowledge 
might have been, the impetus for learning was nonetheless created.  
 The individual, having been informed of such a concept, no longer remains 
'oblivious' to the knowledge concept. Instead the individual is now 'ambiguous' about its 
relative importance and uncertain as to how it intertwines with what is already known. 
An individual interested in peeling the knowledge layers back, an 'inquisitive' individual, 
would be compelled to ask questions resulting in more complex and meaningful 
explanations of knowledge. These further explanations provide meaning, context, and 
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relevance. The explanations provided 'facilitate' the individual's ability to begin creating 
autonomous inferences about how the knowledge is applied; the ambitious might even 
begin to contemplate creative means to leverage this new found knowledge. The 
aforementioned learning sequence is captured in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Learning State Model 
The preceding paragraph is intended to point out the pragmatic learning stages an 
individual might undergo with the introduction of a new concept, idea, process, 
experience, or approach - new is relative to the individual being informed. Consider an 
individual that is first introduced to: a new leadership approach (Small Wars Journal, 
2009); a new intuitive manner to assess and identify the dangers of a fire (Butler, 2010); a 
new trend recently observed in terrorist money laundering and financing activities 
(Paulling, 2009); a differing holistic perspective on treating an unusual gunshot wound  
(Professional Soldiers, 2010). An individual is first oblivious to the approach, process, 
idea, or experience after being informed; the individual's ambiguity on the matter 
prompts queries leading to a better contextual construction. Understanding the relevance, 
application, or environment of this new found information, the individual is now armed 
with the means to develop their own thoughts on the matter, augmenting this new found 
knowledge with their own personal experiences, personalizing and creating new 
knowledge unique to themselves.  
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The aforementioned list of exchanges is not all inclusive. It is a sample illustration 
of actual day to day exchanges facilitated by social media everyday resulting in realized 
knowledge transfers or knowledge creation. The type of knowledge facilitated by such 
media, explicit or tacit, remains to be discussed but the point persists that individuals 
undergoing these exchanges on collaborative social media sites are likely to undergo 
some or all four of the pragmatic learning stages listed in Figure 4: Oblivious, 
Ambiguous, Inquisitive, and Facilitative. Entry into the exploratory learning cycle can 
occur at any one of the stages depending on what the individual already knows.  
1. Learning States Founded in the Hierarchy of Knowledge  
The four learning stages described are part of the knowledge model proposed and 
developed in this chapter; however, it is founded in the hierarchy of knowledge. The 
notion prescribed by the simple and pragmatic four learning stages are that data, 
information, or knowledge received serves as the genesis of interaction on a collaborative 
social media site, propelling the transgression through the applicable learning stages.  
B. THE KNOWLEDGE MODEL  
1. Knowledge Matrix  
Following the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the FBI had to rethink how it 
shared information and knowledge within and with other organizations. The 911 
Commission Report (2004) noted that "each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, 
with risks (criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for 
sharing". The FBI as a result turned an eye to knowledge management to infuse 
knowledge sharing rather than knowledge hoarding. A knowledge matrix was borne from 
their efforts to present a simple conceptual framework of knowledge management. The 
matrix in Figure 5 is an adaptation of the knowledge matrix posted on the on the intranet 
site of the FBI's Chief Knowledge Officer (Paulling, 2009).  
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Figure 5.   Knowledge Matrix (After FBI Knowledge Matrix) 
This nonsensical pragmatic approach illustrates the various informed levels an 
individual, group, or organization might be categorized into, topic dependant. The power 
in this matrix is the use of the pronoun. 'We' can be replaced with 'I' or 'Us" and it would 
indicate the static state of knowledge for the respective entity. The matrix is further 
modified, incorporating the learning state model. Each state of the knowledge matrix is 
married to its corresponding learning state in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Basic Knowledge Model  
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Within the framework, the importance of the entity is emphasized while the 
nature of the data, information, and knowledge flow is only background and merely part 
of the categorical transaction that occurs between individuals, groups, or organizations. 
The simplistic framework belies the complexity of its roots, but its simplicity makes it 
possible to convey to the laymen how a collaborative social media might dramatically 
improve situational awareness, readiness, and productivity. 
2. Knowledge Model Applied  
 Consider the case of a Marine Corps Communications Officer planning the 
regimen of training for the unit's communicators bound for a combat deployment. 
Anxious to prepare the command's communicators beyond the fundamental Individual 
Training Standards (ITS) and the unit's mission specific Mission Essential Task Lists 
(METLS), the Communications Officer and the Communications Chief participate in a 
community of practice looking for ideas that might enhance the communicators' what-if 
scenario training. With the rapid pace of new communications equipment and capabilities 
being introduced, the communications planning staff concede that they simply 'don't 
know what they don't know' and as a result are in an 'oblivious' state. To think otherwise 
would be to imply that all they needed to know was outlined in Field Manuals (FMs), 
After Action Reports (AARs), or captured in the Marine Corps Center for Lessons 




Figure 7.   State 1 of Knowledge Model 
A query to the community elicits a response about the ability to communicate 
target pictures over radios. This is relevant given that the unit's mission is to coordinate 
ordnance delivery on targets. Being able to provide a picture of the target to the 
commander authorizing the ordnance delivery would enhance the unit's ability to 
accomplish its mission. Categorically, the snippet received from the community of 
practice might only be considered data since it lacks context and meaning (Nissen, 2006). 
However, the communications planning staff is now aware that they don't know enough 
about something they now know about. They can choose to remain in this state, or they 
can allow their ambiguousness about the subject matter motivate more queries. Figure 8 
notes their state of uncertainty. 
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Figure 8.   State 2 of Knowledge Model 
The follow on queries are initially naïve demonstrating a lack of know how in this 
process, so the queries elicit more descriptive responses from multiple sources. One 
community of practice member provides a link to a video that demonstrates how it is 
physically done, while another community practice member provides a link to a 
document prepared by their organization that captures the settings required on the radio, 
while yet another provides a narrative account of how his unit managed to use the same 
technique on different types radios and provides the rationale for why that was necessary. 
Although the questions asked were naïve and random, it prompted the sources of 
knowledge to share what they knew about communicating pictures over the radio. As a 
result the Communications Officer and Communications Chief now 'know what they 
don't know'; this is depicted in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9.   State 3 of Knowledge Model 
Highly motivated and inquisitive with this new find, the staff submits further 
queries. However, these queries are precise, specific, and thought provoking aiding the 
facilitation of the knowledge sharing and/or transfer. Submitting to the notions proposed 
by Snowden (2005), this elicitation of insightful questions demonstrating purpose and 
certainty recreates the content of the knowledge sources' knowing and as a result 
facilitates their knowledge use and recall. This follows the thought that "we always know 
what we need to know when we need to know it" (Snowden, 2005). Figure 10 depicts the 
state of the communications staff undergoing this exploratory cycle of learning.  
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Figure 10.   Complete Knowledge Model 
 Having satisfied the information requirements necessary to facilitate action, the 
communications staff plans, coordinates, and executes training based on the new found 
knowledge. Moreover, by marrying their own personal experiences to this knowledge and 
determining how it can be uniquely applied to the organization, the cycle of learning has 
second and third order effects that will impact tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 
within the organization. The knowledge is codified and made unique to their unit. This 
knowledge is then shared with the unit planning to replace them in the combat theatre one 
year later, thus beginning the cycle of learning and facilitating knowledge creation in a 
distant location all over again.   
C. UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE, LEARNING, AND KNOWING 
WITHIN THE MODEL 
 1. Knowledge 
 From a knowledge hierarchy perspective, data was received inspiring the 
ambiguous state. More data and explicit information provided enough context to 
transgress the staff to the inquisitive state. In this state the insightful, thought provoking 
questions prompted more inspired responses.   
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Snowden (2005), who founded the Cynefin Centre, suggests that "we always 
know more than what we can say, and we will always say more that what we can write 
down". This is why better questions inspire better responses. The responses received 
from these thought provoking questions facilitated action on the part of the staff. The 
knowledge framework represents the human factors in these exchanges.   
2. Learning  
Learning in this framework meets the Nissen (2006) interpretation since learning 
is knowledge in motion between two coordinates. It exemplifies the learning states that 
people find themselves in and the motives or mechanics by which they move from one 
learning state to the next. The same however cannot be said with the concept of 
knowing.  
3. Knowing  
The concept of knowing and its use in this pragmatic knowledge framework may 
be troubling to some so it is worth parsing out. Knowing, according to some knowledge 
practitioners refers to knowledge in action and as a result knowing doesn’t occur until 
doing occurs - doing is a knowledge based action (Nissen, 2006). This interpretation 
presents a problem in this framework since the recipient of this knowledge, for instance 
the Communications Officer, will likely never do the act of programming a radio, acquire 
a satellite, take a picture, and transmit the picture over the radio as a potential target - 
neither in training nor in combat. For that matter, under this interpretation, it is very 
unlikely that the Communications Chief will ever 'know' either. However, the 
Communications Officer did do something with what was learned and although the 
officer does not actually execute the process, what was learned through the interaction is 
used to effect changes in a manner commensurate to the level of responsibility. Knowing 
in this respect is very personal and as a result the knowing varies with each individual. 
Similar to the notion that information/knowledge requirements vary by individual 
according to their hierarchical responsibilities (Hayes-Roth, 2006) so too does what an 
individual may do with any given piece of data, information, or knowledge.   
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In the example provided, the Communications Officer could have decided to not 
to seek any more information past the inquisitive state. After all, enough had been learned 
in order to: block out a segment of time in the training schedule for the training event; 
request the dedicated satellite service required; and discuss with the Operations Officer 
the potential change in tactics, techniques, and procedures facilitated with this new found 
capability. In this case the Communications Chief would have continued to carry the 
torch, but like the officer the chief might have decided not to continue developing his 
knowledge on the matter once the explicit procedures were received and handed off to the 
Radio Chief to perform the training. Note however, that action benefitting the unit in both 
cases came as a result of what the staff members had learned, and although they did not 
'know' how to program a radio to perform the subject action, they knew enough to effect 
a tremendous impact.   
Knowing in the sense of doing doesn't occur with everyone and if the knowing-
doing relation were to be maintained, then the importance of the Communications Officer 
and the Communications Chief beginning the initial query might be discounted; 
indirectly suggesting a lesser need for the collaborative social media site. Moreover, the 
organization's gains might be slighted by characterizing everything right up until the 
point that the unit's communicators execute the training as simply increasing the 
knowing-doing gap (Nissen, 2006). Like the proverbial ripple in the pond, the unit and its 
sister organizations were positively impacted, and the increases in productivity measured 
in the unit's ability to deliver bombs on target with much more efficiency, represented a 
gain for the individuals, the group of similar performing units, and the organization.   
4. Knowledge Model Parting Words   
The key element in the framework is the people and their interactions. The 
framework is built to be simple so the construct of the interactions and their benefits can 
be perceived while yet allowing enough flexibility in the knowledge terminology to 




management is in its infancy; there are concepts yet unimagined, with this in mind the 
knowledge model was built to be practical, capturing the basic tenets that will remain true 
through pedagogical changes.   
D. SOCIAL MEDIA MODEL  
1. Analysis of Social Media Examples 
The Eureka effort overcame the challenges present with many organizations 
limited to only sharing localized knowledge. Prior to the Eureka effort, technicians could 
only learn of new techniques from other technicians in their immediate physical circle 
(Gordon, 2010). This explains why in many organizations one group might clearly 
outperform another even though both are similarly equipped and manned.   
Such a case is not inconceivable between two infantry battalions within the same 
regiment. The company commanders in one infantry battalion might outperform the 
company commanders in another infantry battalion during pre-deployment training; the 
delta in performance comes as a result of the combat experience inherent in the cadre of 
better performing commanders (Dixon, 2007). The territorial nature of commands can 
preclude the sharing of knowledge between commands, and therefore the command 
lacking combat veterans is not able to gain from the overall regimental knowledge in 
inventory (Dixon, 2007). Whether separated by geographical distances, as was the case 
for the Eureka technicians, or separation due to the culture of the organization, as is 
suggested in the example of the infantry battalions, similarly equipped and manned 
elements can exhibit drastically different performance levels as a result of knowledge 
gaps. The key to an organization increasing their competitive edge is to tap into its 
knowledge of inventory by creating ways of increasing access to its knowledge stores and 
ensuring its organization promotes and rewards knowledge sharing.   
The community of practice created by Xerox through its Eureka project was built 
on the "more adaptive coalescence of purpose" instead of an "aggregation of function" 
(Snowden, 2005). A social network community based on identity instead of  
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individualism and assembled under a unified purpose experiences a much more powerful 
stimulus (Snowden, 2005), generating the kind of voluntary sharing that propels the 
success of the knowledge model presented.   
Consider this analogous to a community created solely for company commanders; 
it is a community with an identity 'company commanders' and coalesced with a single 
purpose of grooming commanders (Dixon, 2007; Snowden 2005). The Army refers to 
their CompanyCommander.mil community as a community of practice with a single 
purpose. Moreover, the Army creates subsections of the different types of company 
commanders. For example, there are Signal Corps Company Commanders, Maintenance 
Company Commanders, and Infantry Company Commanders among many others. As 
observed by the examples of the Eureka technicians and the scientific community 
participating in NASA's Spacebook, a group that identifies by identity can overcome trust 
issues arising from the lack of strength in participant ties. The lack of close interpersonal 
relationships is not an issue when the community they belong to has a strong identity.   
The Xerox Amber Web effort sprung from the successes experienced with Eureka 
took on a different approach. Although the social networking conditions were stimulated 
top down and the site's successes emerged from its bottom up growth in the same Eureka 
manner, Amber Web tended to be much more informal than Eureka. Adherence to a more 
informal structure followed the informality tenets prescribed by Cross et al. (2001). The 
informality of the site prompted frank and open discussion on a variety of subjects. This 
might be a problem if the intent was to communicate with a single purpose - as was the 
case with the Eureka technicians.   
The drawback here is that the incredible growth Amber Web experienced might 
work against it in the long run. The site was originally created for its scientists to 
communicate; however eventually the business planners also joined. The site’s growth 
from 500 to 30,000 could serve to dilute the original intent of the site: collaborate among 
the scientific community to avoid missed opportunities from its Palo Alto Research 
Center. The Army’s BCKS organization warns of the dangers of informal social networks 
noting that these networks lack the close personal ties needed to effect knowledge 
transfers (U.S. Army, 2010); moreover, with a lack of an identity as Snowden (2005) 
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suggests is necessary, the social network might succumb to a general forum lacking the 
dialogue the organization had intended to promote. It is not about size if the content is 
lacking. Growth in a social network should follow the intended goal.   
NASA’s Spacebook has adhered to its intended goals. The site was established for 
its scientist community and it maintains that identity. The team mentality within NASA 
makes Spacebook an ideal collaboration space. Scientists have been able to grow ideas 
from each other. The process of adapting and personalizing resulting in the creation of 
multiple nuances of innovative ideas is an organization value added. Consider Spacebook 
to be NASA’s own think tank producing results from its rich knowledge in inventory; its 
size is only 850 members since having been started in 2009, similar to the original 500 
Xerox's Amber Web began with before it lost its scientific only flavor and grew to 30,000 
members (Powers, 1999; White House, 2009).        
Organizations that can evolve faster are more adaptive to their environments 
(Hayes-Roth, 2006); the flow of ideas connecting the multitude of organizational 
synapses that would have otherwise been limited to local knowledge in inventory 
produces an organization that evolves faster than its competitors. Organizations can exact 
competitive advantages by setting the conditions for their collaborative sites, allowing it 
to grow in grass roots fashion, nurturing the organizational values it holds dear, and 
identifying undesirable phenomena that can be influenced to self correct.   
The commercial site ProfessonalSoldiers.com is a Special Forces only 
collaboration site that is quick to self correct. Likewise, communities with identities like 
those observed on CompanyCommander.mil quickly self correct as well. The 
professionalism on these sites trumps the varied commentary observed on informal sites 
with no singly focused purpose.   
Consider the case of the e-mail mentorship. Although the notion of mentoring 
disparate locations and linking people to effect professional growth was admirable, many 
of the tenets for facilitating knowledge flows were missing. Access to the knowledge in 
inventory was limited to only one mentor vice a community of midwives spanning a 
spectrum of experience. Moreover, the conditions and the relationships were established 
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top down. The strength of ties was weak and as a result so was the trust between the 
mentor and mentees. Lastly, motivation to be an active participant in the mentor-mentee 
relation was lacking. This explains why participants were unwilling to want to continue 
the mentor-mentee activities in their personal time.   
Both virtual scenarios situations could have been greatly enhanced, if both had 
access to a greater pool of collaborators with whom they could learn from, contribute, or 
train with. The technology in both these cases limited their ability for further exploitation. 
The midwife case was more wrought with technological challenges than the tactical 
language system because it was not as well funded. However, the point persists; a social 
media collaboration looking to facilitate knowledge flows must take into account its 
information technology structure and note its limitations in order to qualitatively assess 
the return on knowledge from such an endeavor.  
The Toshiba and Battle Command Knowledge System are examples of how a 
collaborative site can bring all manner of collaborative technology to facilitate 
knowledge flows. However, this does not imply that throwing social media technology in 
a mixing bowl and making it accessible produces desired results. On the other hand, the 
knowledge strategy should be chosen surgically in order to meet the organization's 
desired goals.   
Although the Toshiba example demonstrates a hodgepodge of technology, it does 
not make the case of how it was going to surgically use that technology to facilitate 
explicit or tacit knowledge flows. Moreover, even though the Army has leveraged all 
manner of technological advances in social media and made it available to its members, it 
has surgically adapted those technologies to ensure the knowledge flows facilitated meet 
the specific goals sought. With respect to virtual communities, Figure 11 depicts how the 
Army’s Battle Command Knowledge System has matched goals sought with the 
collaborative social media means to accomplish said goals.  
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Figure 11.   Marriage of Collaborative Social Media and Organizational Goals (From 
BCKS) 
From the many cases of social media observed in Chapter III, the tenets of human 
social interactions and knowledge flows in the literature review, and the analysis of the 
social media vignettes, the social media model in Figure 12 is presented.  The model 
provides considerations that should be taken into account when evaluating a social media 
endeavor intended to facilitate knowledge flows. 
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Figure 12.   Social Media Consideration Model 
E. AIR NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY CASE STUDY  
The case study presented is of a Marine Corps Combat Unit that has prepared for 
and executed a combat deployment. As a result of the classified nature of combat 
operations and the sensitivity of many of the details described herein, the names, 
locations, operations, and timelines involved with the case study have all been replaced 
with alternates. Any mention of actual locations has been first observed in an unclassified 
approved for public release document; references are provided in those cases. Billeted 
positions are favored throughout the presentation of the case study. The case study is of a 
Marine Corps Unit: Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO).   
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1. Methodology  
Adhering to the case study tenets presented by Yin (1994) in Case Study Research 
Design and Methods, this is a Type 1 case study. The unique and extreme nature of this 
case study qualifies under the Type 1 parameters of a single case, single unit of analysis. 
The military unit in the case study is an extremely intensive knowledge driven unit. 
Among Marine Corps units it is highly unique bearing subject matter experts at every 
level of the unit's hierarchy (Grice, 2009). The case study spans three timeframes: the 
pre-deployment phase, relief in place operations, and sustained combat operations in the 
combat theatre. Although ANGLICO is unique in capability, structure, and mission, the 
knowledge challenges presented bear resemblance to knowledge challenges in other 
military, civil, and public organizations.  
Adhering to the Yin (1994) case study tenets, the case study analysis is provided 
from both direct observation and participant-observer. The investigator was primarily 
assigned as the Communications Officer within the unit. ANGLICO is a communications 
intensive unit with an imbedded communications element equipped with a 
comprehensive suite of communications equipment and personnel at every level of the 
organization's hierarchy. The intense nature of communications in terms of personnel and 
equipment provided the Communications Officer access to every level of the 
organization. Moreover, the demanding communications training requirements of an 
ANGLICO provided the investigator with keen insight on pre-deployment training at 
every level of the organization. Additional billets held by the investigator providing 
unique insight from several different perspectives including Commander of the 
Headquarters element during all three phases of the case study. This provided further 
insight to the non-communications related training requirements. Moreover, the 
investigator also held the billet of Information Management Officer through all three 
phases of the case study. This latter billet facilitated the investigator’s understanding of 
knowledge flow challenges from an information management perspective. Lastly, while 
in the combat theatre the investigator was able to fly by helicopter or other means to visit 
and discuss relevant matters with many of the teams dispersed throughout the 1600 
square mile area of operations. 
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2. Background  
ANGLICO has a long proud history of service to the country but often little is 
known about it so a bit of background is necessary to understand the complexity and 
knowledge intensiveness of its operations. ANGLICO has been in existence for over 50 
years. Its mission is "to provide Marine Air Ground Task Force commanders a liaison 
capability… to plan, coordinate, employ, and conduct terminal control of fires in support 
of joint, allied, and coalition forces" (Grice, 2009). ANGLICO provides the Marine Air 
Ground Task Force Commander (MAGTF) a trusted agent that can provide non-Marine 
units with planning and expertise to leverage Marine and Navy combat power in the form 
of close air support (CAS), naval gunfire (NGF), artillery, and mortars. Each of these 
specific aforementioned areas of expertise requires a tremendous amount of knowledge. 
Subject matter experts in each of these categories reside at every level of the organization 
depicted in Figure 13.  
  
 
Figure 13.   ANGLICO Organizational Structure (from Koch) 
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Commander's have leveraged ANGLICO's capabilities to nonorganic units 
including: the Republic of Korea marine corps and army; the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam; Australian army; British Royal Marines; Polish army, Special Operations 
Forces; coalition forces from Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
and Kuwait; U.S. Army; military transition teams (MiTTs), and Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) among others (Grice, 2009).  ANGLICO has served in operations spanning from: 
the pacific amphibious landings of World War II; landings at the Battle of Inchon, Korea 
1950; Lebanon; Dominican Republic; Grenada; humanitarian missions spanning the 
globe; Desert Shield and Desert Storm; to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and Operation 
Enduring Freedom among others  (Ahern, Cunniffe, & McCarthy, 2005; Grice, 2009; 
Koch, 2007). As evidenced by the aforementioned lineage, ANGLICO serves the joint 
community and as a result of serving multiple types of forces the knowledge flow 
demands are great.   
Each element of the ANGLICO team depicted in Figure 13 augments a supported 
element in order to provide it with the planning expertise to employ the full spectrum of 
fire support available to the Navy-Marine Corps team. ANGLICO is equivalent to a 
standard Marine Corps battalion level command, but it is readily equipped to provide 
support from a division level unit to a line company as depicted by the chart. The level of 
expertise required to provide this level of support resides in: the Headquarters; the 
Brigade platoon (Bde); the Supporting Arms Liaison Team (SALT); and the Fire Power 
Control Team (FCT).   
Each team has doctrinal support missions; however, the nature of joint and 
coalition forces support has meant that ANGLICO has had to maintain a level of 
flexibility unique to even Marine Corps units. No two combat deployments in the last 
five years have been the same. The level of fluidity with respect to the terrain being 
covered, to the units being supported, to the manner in which the support is provided is 
uniquely challenging. The unit is comprised of: naval aviators capable of performing 
close air support and surface to surface integration; artillery men and scout observers; 
communicators; naval officers qualified in naval surface fires; interpreters; and the full 
complement of supply, logistical, motor vehicle support personnel one might find in a 
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Marine Corps battalion. All of this capability is wrapped into a unit comprising of 
approximately 200 Marines and sailors (Grice, 2009; Koch, 2007).  
ANGLICO is a very top heavy organization relative to its Marine Corps brethren. 
The Marine Corps averages the lowest enlisted-officer ratio of all the services at 8.33 
enlisted per officer (Marine Corps Community Services, 2007); however, ANGLICO is 
officer heavy relative to the remainder of the Marine Corps at about 4.03 enlisted per one 
officer. Given the high level order tasking performed by each team in ANGLICO, there is 
at least one officer or one staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) embedded at each level 
of the unit; e.g. a four man FCT has an officer in charge.  As noted by Riley (1991), "The 
density of officer-led teams with a high number of NCOs provides an infrastructure much 
like that of the Special Forces.”  This again is indicative of the demanding knowledge 
requirements.   
Teams are expected to perform any number missions from being able to: conduct 
a helicopter-borne combat resupply; prepare a traditional fire plan; establish a fire support 
coordination center; establish a tactical air control party; perform the functions of 
offensive air, aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, control of aircraft and missiles, 
and assault support; or explain how the Marine Corps planning process works (Grice, 
2009). Each and every team must inherently be able to execute any of the aforementioned 
tasks. More importantly each team at every level likely serves as an advisor to the 
supported unit commander providing expert advice on planning and employment of Navy 
and Marine Corps fires.   
3. Current Flows of Knowledge  
Marine units preparing for a combat deployment and anticipating relief in place 
operations with the unit they will be relieving in the combat theatre are data, information, 
and knowledge hungry.  The primary means of communications with the unit in theatre 
and the unit set to replace them is the Situation Report (SITREP).  Telephone and e-mail 
is of course available but telephone calls are generally not used for communications 
given the time differences, the desire not to interrupt the unit during combat operations, 
or simply not knowing the battle rhythm or when the counterpart will be available.  
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Telephone calls are usually conducted by the highest levels of the command: generally 
the Operations Officer (OpsO), the Executive Officer (XO), or the Commanding Officer 
(CO).  E-mail is also another asynchronous means of communications that is problematic.  
The fire and wait aspect of the communiqués between the counterparts is generally not 
very conducive to pass on tacit knowledge of the area or other matters that require vetting 
and elaboration.    
Moreover, the SITREP is a document fit for a hierarchal vertical organization.  
The SITREPS are daily reports generated by all the teams and vetted through their 
vertical chains of commands.  At every level of the chain of command through the 
headquarters, the SITREP gets 'scrubbed' for details that would otherwise be considered 
minutiae.  Even if the reports get to the headquarters in raw form, the final product 
produced at the Headquarters from the compilation of team reports is prepared 
commensurate to the levels of responsibility of senior officers; as Hayes-Roth (2006) 
declares, the information needs are not the same at all levels of the organization.  In other 
words, team leaders at the FCT, SALT, Bde levels, and headquarters staff personnel 
largely receive snippets of interesting data and information that do not enable action on 
the receiving end. 
Another means to potentially garner information from is the mid-deployment 
lessons learned prepared by the combat unit in theatre.  This document is specifically 
prepared for the unit that is planning the execution of the relief in place.  The document is 
prepared by each functional area and combat team in the combat theatre and the lessons 
learned are consolidated at the headquarters for further submission to the unit doing the 
relieving.  This document is generally full of useful information but often lacks the 
context and elaboration required to enact action.  The lack of a dialogue restricts how 
much could actually be ascertained from the lessons learned.     
Lastly, another means of gathering information relative to the combat theatre the 
unit is preparing to deploy to is to use the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned 
(MCCLL).  One prevalent issue with using MCCLL is presented by Capt Cuomo:  
"MCCLL doesn't normally produce information that's specific to an area of operation 
(AO) or that speaks directly to the lessons learned by a squad leader or platoon 
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commander in a specific town-not ideal in a COIN (counter insurgency) fight where the 
nature of the insurgency from town to town, and even from block to block, is often very 
different" (Cuomo, 2007).  Moreover, although MCCLL is a great tool in the absence of 
anything else, it is only capturing explicit knowledge at best with no means of opening a 
dialogue to explore the context and relevance in order for the individual to be facilitated 
to take action with it.    
4. Issues Exacerbated in the Absence of a Collaborative Medium  
An unclassified MCCLL report released during the pre-deployment phase advised 
of possible fire hazards in overtaxing electrical wiring and infrastructure in buildings with 
existing combat operations centers.  Naturally an e-mail was sent requesting to know if 
this was a problem in theatre.  The response was 'it was not a problem', and to the credit 
of the unit in theatre there was not a problem with the electrical system. However, the 
lack of a genuine dialogue failed to produce further insightful questions that might have 
highlighted other serious deficiencies that weren't asked.     
Applying the tenets of the knowledge and social model, the unit in the pre-
deployment phase simply didn't know what they didn't know.  However, if a knowledge 
sharing community existed between the two units, then the asking unit could have tapped 
into the knowledge in inventory within the deployed unit. Instead of an asynchronous e-
mail transaction with a single individual, the ANGLICO community members could have 
posted and responded to the question ‘are there any electrical issues we need to be aware 
of?’ The result would have been a collective response that would have highlighted other 
deficiencies. It might have come to light that although the headquarters did not have any 
power issues, many of the teams did have issues that no one was aware of.  A discussion 
of power might have led to the revelation that none of the teams nor the headquarters' 
combat operations center had uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) for back-up power. 
Back-up power is important to any organization; however, as Snowden (2002) suggested, 
people always know more than what they say. Their knowledge needs to be facilitated.    
The takeaway in the above example is that in such a case, knowledge limited to 
one person is less desirable than knowledge from a collective.  Emailing the entire 
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combat unit in theatre would have been entirely inappropriate. However, if a community 
of practice site for all ANGLICO's existed, then one of the ANGLICO members might 
have aired that an electrical issue existed at a particular site. That one question would 
have had second and third order effects.  A discussion of power would have led to a 
discussion of backup power in static positions or perhaps a discussion of backup power in 
mobile situations.  The end result is that the chain of events would have resulted in both 
units being better prepared for an uneventful loss of power; an event that is not too 
farfetched for a combat zone.  
In a similar situation, a SITREP from the unit in the combat theatre included a 
team comment indicating it was necessary to buy LNA cables (low noise amplifier). That 
was it. It said nothing more. The order in the rear was then buy LNA cables in 
preparation for the deployment. However, no one knew why or what purpose they served. 
The commentary was not only devoid of the technical specifications that would be 
needed to proceed with a purchase, but it lacked any details for its purpose which might 
have facilitated the unit in the rear to determine specifications required based on its 
planned the use.  The SITREP was not the appropriate venue for such details.  It took two 
weeks before running to ground the reason for why these cables were needed.  Given the 
acquisitions processing time, two weeks was a considerable amount of time to wait 
before taking action.  Moreover, as it turned out, the cables needed to be of a particular 
length and quality with specific connectors in order to remote the unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) feeds.  Based on the response from a single element, it was thought that 
50 ft of cable was an adequate length.  However it wasn't until a personal visit into 
theatre on a site survey coordination trip, that it was discovered that 50 feet of cable was 
not enough at all team sites. Some sites needed 100 feet due to the nature of their set up.  
These small and seemingly inconsequential issues had real effects on the ground. The 
liaison teams attempting to determine hostile intent and hostile action from the video 
feeds were making due with poor signal quality on ad hoc cables.        
Here is another case where knowledge did not rest in any single person. The 
collective needed to fill the gaps because there were knowledge gaps in theatre about who 
had problems. Without knowing that other teams in theatre were viewing their feeds 
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static free, it became simply a matter of working with what you had and not griping about 
it. Due to the unit dispersion, it was not uncommon for teams to not see each other for six 
months; even in theatre, a community of practice that could have tapped into its rich and 
varied sources of knowledge was critical even if was just designed for sharing knowledge 
internally to the unit in theatre.    
Placement of combat gear on the body was another issue toiled over during the 
pre-deployment phase.  The unit lacked ANGLICO combat veterans who could indicate 
how the many pieces of ANGLICO equipment a Marine carried were best positioned.   
Although the placement of gear appears as if it requires no more than an explicit 
description, easily addressed with a diagram noting prescribed position of the combat 
equipment, the placement of combat equipment on the body is a tacit knowledge 
decision. Optimal equipment positioning is learned from its wear in multiple combat 
situations determining how it is best positioned for maximum efficiency.  Provided a 
collaborative site existed between the unit in combat and the unit in the rear, a simple 
query on the matter might produce: the combat unit's standard operating procedures 
(SOP); multiple pictures detailing how team leaders, radio operators, and scout observers 
wore their gear; and or video taken by a team operator(s) describing why the gear was 
worn in a particular way.  The asynchronous means of communication, e-mail, yielded a 
copy of the combat SOP; however, that came devoid of any content, relevance, or 
rationale for why.  The why is the type of knowledge that would have facilitated the unit 
in the rear to begin making its own inferences on the matter.  Knowing the why from 
many different combat perspectives would have facilitated the creation of tacit 
knowledge much more rapidly during the rear unit's pre-deployment training.  The 
combat SOP only provided the explicit results of their tacit thought as it was at the time 
of its publishing.  The best responses on the matter would have been from the team 
members themselves who had tested the combat SOP and discovered what gear 
placement might have been best under certain conditions.   
The ANGLICO Training and Readiness (T&R) manual drives the training 
schedule.  The T&R establishes the training requirements.  Subject matter experts 
(SMEs) develop mission essential task lists (METLs) derived from the Marine Corps task 
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list (MCTL) (CMC, 2007).  However, the T&R indicates that it only establishes the 
minimum standards for training (CMC, 2007).  A community of practice that tied all 
three active duty ANGLICOs together would serve as a rich repository of knowledge 
experience, from which innovate training ideas and other emergent phenomena could be 
nurtured.  Such discussions occur on the Army's BCKS site.  It is best to be prepared 
when you get into theatre then to determine that you need to learn something on fly.  
A major concern of team leaders turning over responsibility to the incoming unit 
was about conveying the lay of the land.  This meant more than just going over points on 
a map, but getting to understand the type of relationships that the outgoing team had 
established during their tenure.  One team leader conveyed that the supported foreign 
nationals despised the military turnovers because the foreign nationals felt they were 
starting from scratch.  A Marine Corps Gazette article describes a similar experience 
(Russell, 2009).  One team leader described that after working so hard at establishing a 
secure relation it was a shame he was not able to convey all that he knew to the team 
replacing him in the few short days they had together to turn over.  This disruption in 
relations could be mitigated by early engagement of the team leaders in the rear and the 
team leaders in the combat theatre.  Pictures, videos, and narratives could be provided as 
early as possible.  This builds the situational awareness and mentally prepares the 
incoming teams of their area of responsibilities even before they assume it or step foot 
into the area.  Another team described that if it took writing a diary, then that is what 
would be done.  Team leaders placed a tremendous amount of pride in the work they had 
accomplished over their tenure and wanted the successes experienced to be carried 
forward.     
The loss of tacit knowledge is not unique to any one unit or combat area of 
operations.  Another article in the Marine Corps Gazette titled Intelligence Information 
Management described the following case:  
During a recent deployment to OIF as a battalion S-2, I discovered that 
one of our local tribal leaders was in fact a nationally influential 
businessman. I pulled everything possible on this individual from the TFC 
databases, spoke to the regimental combat team (RCT) S-2 to try to gather 
additional details and searched every theater-level database I could find. I 
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spoke to radio battalion to seek any information they had on the 
individual. After several hours of researching, I wrote an assessment of 
how this individuals connections might impact our A O. The next day an 
officer who had been out of theater for approximately a year contacted me 
via e-mail. He had extensive knowledge of my person of interest. He knew 
about connections that no one in the current intelligence chain was aware 
of. The amount of information he provided dramatically improved my and 
my commanders’ knowledge of this key personality and his impact on our 
AO. I was staggered by the amount of quality knowledge that had been 
lost in the year since he departed theater. And while it was satisfying to 
feel like I'd "unlocked the code" regarding this person of interest, I also 
realized that the discovery of this knowledge was based on chance and one 
individual's being "on the ball." But it was none too surprising that this 
type of knowledge had just "disappeared," despite the fact that the officer 
with the knowledge confirmed he had turned it over to his relief. The 
failure isn't based on individuals; it's systemic.  (Kralovec, 2009)  
The aforementioned comment makes the case for a community of purpose.  The 
Army terminology for a community of purpose is a community that is put together with a 
single purpose with a set duration.  Communities of purpose between people turning over 
are a potential notion worth exploring.   
In a combat zone, being able to adapt to the changing conditions faster than the 
enemy provides an advantage.  On the other hand, consider an insurgent enemy with an 
ability to communicate successful new methods to overcome the latest improved 
explosive device (IED) defeat tactic.  Communicating the technique to other insurgent 
regions faster than a trend can be determined provides the enemy a considerable 
advantage.    
A team leader in location Yankee conjured a new manner of exploiting the 
technology they had recently been issued. While other teams fumbled with how to use the 
technology, the team leader at Yankee was tech savvy and immediately embraced the 
technology.  Determined to find a more efficient means of identifying hostiles, the team 
leader leveraged historical intelligence data, aerial feeds, with radio and message traffic 
of the ground being covered to better advise the supported commander.  This technique 
however ingenious was only being practiced by the team leader at Yankee.  With no  
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readily available means to convey the technique to all the other teams spread throughout 
the area of operations, the successes as a result of the new technology was limited to only 
Yankee.   
 In the combat theatre, with elements spread out, it is critical to have a means of 
sharing knowledge in a manner that flattens the organization's flow of knowledge.  
Eventually the technique was picked up by the headquarters and was slowly disseminated 
to other teams; however, a faster assimilation process is preferred.   
Many within the ANGLICO community will note that ANGLICO is about the big 
'L'.  The big L refers to the critical liaison mission performed as the MAGTF 
Commander's representative.  Bringing the intent of the MAGTF Commander and having 
the means to leverage a tremendous fires capability on behalf of the supported unit can be 
quickly turned on its head if the relationship between the supported unit and the liaison 
element sours.  Challenging liaison-supported element relationships are not the norm but 
they do occur.  Generally it is a matter of the supported unit not understanding what an 
ANGLICO can bring to bear for the unit.  Generally, a good team leader can sell the 
team's capability set and seamlessly integrate into the supported unit's planning process.  
In this manner, the team can serve their role as advisors on how to best leverage the 
combined fires available.    
However, the skills required to perform the aforementioned are not part of any 
formal training program.  These skills are tacit skills.  Generally, the best team leaders are 
the ones that have performed the liaison mission before.  They recognize the tenuousness 
of the supported unit and are prepared to relieve tensions before the friction points 
become a problem.  Mentorship in such situations is essential. In preparation for a 
subsequent combat deployment, the veteran combat team leaders were often providing 
stories of the challenges they faced and how they were overcome.  The confidence 
inspired in this group of new joint terminal air controllers (JTACs) was palpable relative 
to the lack of confidence in preparation for the initial deployment.  Knowledge flow 
challenges in the initial pre-deployment phase were primarily due to a knowledge gap 
that existed within the ANGLICO community.  There were the very experienced and the 
very inexperienced.  Such conditions could be alleviated through capturing the story 
 73
telling.  Other organizations including the Army have turned to storytelling and 
folksonomies to convey tacit knowledge that would have been otherwise very difficult to 
convey explicitly in other forms (U.S. Army, 2010).    
Another aspect of the above observation is that of the liaison element of the 
mission.  On several occasions the investigator conducted initial staff-staff coordination 
with the senior elements of the supported units in anticipation of the joint endeavor.  The 
trepidation observed at the senior elements of the supported unit was generally due to not 
knowing what: (1) an ANGLICO could do for them; (2) why they needed an ANGLICO 
to begin with; and (3) the tension that arises when limited resources must be shared with 
another augmenting element.  These concerns were generally laid to rest with the senior 
staff once the above concerns were addressed.  ANGLICO brought a tremendous 
knowledge base that could be used to wield a tremendous combined arms effect.  Without 
an ANGLICO, coordinating the use of Navy-Marine corps fire power assets was difficult.  
Lastly, ANGLICO was almost an entirely self contained unit that not only brought fire 
support coordination knowledge to the fight, but was handsomely equipped with an array 
of mobile and man-packed communications equipment generally providing an advanced 
capability set to the supported unit.  
Although the concerns at the senior levels were laid to rest, the trepidation 
continued to exist with the subordinate elements ANGLICO was planned to augment.  It 
was observed that these concerns generally persisted until the teams were able to 
formally present themselves and their capabilities.  Although this sounds like the normal 
course of things, the liaison process could be entirely improved through a community of 
purpose.  A community of purpose would provide a purpose driven social media 
collaborative space with the sole intent of linking the ANGLICO unit and the joint forces 
to be supported in a collaborative space inherent with explicit and tacit forms of 
knowledge sharing.  The collaborative space could have data repositories that have 
videos of ANGLICO in action and documents describing its structure and inherent 
capability set at each level of the ANGLICO organization.  Moreover, the 
aforementioned can also be matched with a forum capability that facilitates the varying 
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states of the knowledge model.  The end result is a supported unit relationship that builds 
strong roots before even entering combat training and combat operations.  
Through the course of the research, the investigator has become aware that such a 
capability existed within the Army at the time of conducting coordination for a liaison 
mission performed with one of the Army's premiere fighting forces.  The Army has an 
inherent capability within the Battle Command Knowledge System to create communities 
of purpose (U.S. Army, 2010).  Moreover, it has the ability for joint forces with a 
common access card (CAC) to join their community.  A collaborative endeavor could 
have been established between the two units, facilitating a dialogue between the many 
elements of the supported unit and the ANGLICO team leaders.  This might have served 
to facilitate the planning by Army supported unit planners at every level.  Without any 
prior contact, many of the Army subordinate elements first learn how to integrate 
ANGLICO into their planning cycle only after the teams show up on their door steps.  
Although the deployment with the Army unit went extremely well, no doubt in great part 
to the professionalism of the team leaders at every level, the potential collaboration 
possibilities on a collaborative site with all the aforementioned capabilities represents a 
missed opportunity.  These missed opportunities are not uncommon.  It’s a representation 
of the first state of the knowledge model; we simply do not know what we don't know.    
5. Case Study Parting Words  
There are undoubtedly network challenges in a combat environment.  Moreover, 
not all combat environments are equally mature facilitating the sort of discourse 
suggested to the lowest levels of the organization.  Nonetheless, the case study is meant 
to illustrate a cross section of the knowledge challenges many organizations will or have 
experienced in the three phases discussed herein.  Moreover, analogous knowledge gaps 
exist in the private and public sector.  These challenges are not going away.  They are 
persistent problems that serve as sources of inefficiency.  On the other hand, there is no 
doubt that technology is continuing to evolve and that the shortfalls in network access 
and bandwidth limitations will be addressed in the short run.  The knowledge flow 
problems are long term problems that need to be recognized, and adaptive approaches 
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need to be developed in tandem to current technologies and in the advance of future 
technologies.  Facilitating knowledge from where it exists to where it does not places the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH  
The research set out to ascertain if knowledge flows were facilitated by social 
media, and if the application of social media could address the knowledge flow 
challenges presented in the case study.  The end state was to make a determination about 
the ability for social media to facilitate knowledge flows resulting in realized gains to 
readiness, productivity, and situational awareness.  In order to accomplish the 
aforementioned objective, a solid understanding in the foundation of both knowledge 
flows and social networking dynamics was necessary.  The Chapter II literature review 
was dedicated to the discovery of knowledge flows and social network dynamics.  
Having established a foundation for conducting an examination of social media 
facilitated knowledge flows, a cross section of social media vignettes were presented in 
Chapter III.  The examples described provided keen insight as to how private, public, and 
military organizations have leveraged Semantic Web, Web 1.0, Web 2.0, and social 
semantic Web 3.0 technologies to effect knowledge transfers and knowledge sharing.  
Having gleaned the fundamentals of knowledge flows and social networks from both an 
academic and practical perspective, both a knowledge flow and social media model were 
developed in Chapter IV.  These models were developed with the intent of providing a 
framework by which the case study could be qualitatively examined.  The combination of 
the two developed models is presented herein as the Social Media Knowledge Flow 
Facilitation Framework.  The framework captures the marriage of the knowledge flow 
and social networking tenets derived from the literature review and the lessons learned 
from the social media vignettes in Chapter III.  It serves as a framework for any 
organization seeking to effect knowledge sharing and knowledge transfers through the 
use of social media.  The pragmatic nature of the framework belies the complexity of its 
roots; the underlying tenets of the framework are detailed in the development of the 
models.    
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Figure 14.    Social Media Knowledge Flow Facilitation Framework 
The Chapter IV case study presented was of a knowledge intensive military 
organization.  Albeit the knowledge flow challenges presented in the case study were 
military oriented, the challenges were representative of knowledge flow challenges 
inherent in private and public organizations.  The competitive advantages sought from 
facilitating knowledge from where it exists to where it is needed is a persistent theme 
crossing organizational constructs and culture.  This chapter draws conclusions from the 
development of the models, the analysis of the vignettes, and the decomposition of the 
case study.  These conclusions serve to answer the questions that served as the impetus of 
the research.    
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B. CONCLUSIONS  
1. Research Question Findings  
Can social networking technologies be leveraged to gain operational advantages 
and training efficiencies within and between Marine Corps units conducting pre-
deployment training and executing relief in place operations?  
The examination of the case study provided a plethora of examples of how social 
media could address the knowledge clumping experienced by units conducting pre-
deployment training, reliefs in place, and sustained combat operations.  The research has 
demonstrated that the beneficial results ascribed from leveraging any number of social 
media technologies to the aforementioned activities can be impactful, bearing the 
potential to generate realized momentum.    
For instance, returning to the example presented by the case study of a unit that 
performs an arduous liaison mission with myriad coalition and joint forces.  Social media 
could be leveraged to transfer: explicit knowledge in the form of documents; tacit 
knowledge in the form of narratives; and tacit and explicit user generated content in a 
forum type environment.  ANGLICO, the case study unit, bears an enduring challenge in 
selling the reason why they are needed by the coalition or joint force they have been 
tasked to provide fire support coordination support.  As the MAGTF Commander's 
representative, they link the augmented non-Marine unit to the Marine contingency 
bearing the ability to levy a devastating array of combined fires.  Moreover, ANGLICO 
also provides the augmented unit the ability to levy the aerial reconnaissance assets 
afforded to the MAGTF Commander.  As is said in the business, 'ANGLICO  is a good 
piece of gear'.  Nonetheless, in the absence of strong interpersonal relationships the 
Marine Corps ANGLICO unit often finds itself building and nurturing these liaison 
relationships on the fly.  Although the astute team leaders of the organization have made 
it work with an impressive array of units worldwide, the leveraging of social media prior 
to the combat deployment presents a unique opportunity to demystify and fortify the 
liaison relationship prior to leaving the garrison site.  Moreover, the knowledge gained by 
both entities facilitates the complex integration of each into the other's operational 
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planning cycle.  Arguably, the speed with which a unit can 'hit the ground running' 
presents a sizeable advantage relative to one that experiences the operational lull often 
associated with the conduct of a RIP.   This application of social media is not relevant to 
only military units looking to establish relationships before serving in the combat zone; 
this approach is also applicable to private organizations looking to develop interpersonal 
relationships between their geographically dispersed divisions.  How such measures 
might be leveraged is further discussed in the recommendation section  
What knowledge flow requirements exist within and between units conducting 
training and executing relief in place operations/?  
From the knowledge flow literature review and from the cross section of 
challenges presented, it is apparent that both explicit and tacit knowledge requirements 
exist during the varying stages of the training-deployment cycle.  The knowledge flow 
intensiveness of the organization presented in the case study typifies the knowledge flow 
requirements of many other military units.  Moreover, these knowledge flow 
requirements are analogous to many in the private and public sector.    
For example, following this year's Cyber Shock Wave exercise, top leaders in the 
cyber defense community noted that a collaborative space bridging the private and 
federal cyber defense warriors was necessary for sharing both explicit and tacit 
knowledge; the absence of such a collaborative site has weakened the nation's cyber 
defense posture (Starks, 2010).  These same knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer 
requirements are required within and between units conducting training and executing 
turnovers in the combat theatre.    
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) change from deployment to 
deployment and deriving those changes can come from a codified document.  However, 
the manner in which those TTPs are employed and carried out is a tacit decision.  For 
example, the Army has created an experiential learning social media space where units 
preparing to deploy can view and listen to narratives provided from units in the field.  
The research has established that narratives are one means of transferring tacit 
knowledge.  The verbal and nonverbal cues provided in visual narratives provide more 
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context and meaning then any set of codified TTPs or rules of engagement (ROEs).  The 
leader of an Army observation post (OP) can describe with painstaking detail the myriad 
of considerations undertaken in the seconds he assessed what to do as a vehicle 
proceeded at high speeds towards the checkpoint.  Armed with the explicit TTPs for such 
a case, the explicit response was to engage at a specified distance; however the decision 
was weighed against a number of other considerations which relied on tacit knowledge - 
the knowledge that existed in the mind of the service member.    
The case study pointed out how ANGLICO is replete with tacit knowledge 
requirements specifically when it comes to the performance of the liaison mission.  The 
skill sets required to sell your capabilities and the interpersonal skills required to win the 
hearts and minds of the supported unit are not explicitly described in the ANGLICO 
training and readiness manual.  Having "knowledge of the structure of all elements of a 
MEU sized MAGTF organization" in and of itself does not sell a mission (CMC, 2007).  
Therefore the transfer of these tacit skills internally within the unit from the combat 
veterans to the rookie team leaders greatly enhances the unit's liaison mission 
effectiveness.  Moreover, the example was provided of two battalions within the same 
regiment bearing starkly different performance due to the lack of combat veterans in one 
relative to the other.  Providing a means to facilitate the transfer of explicit and tacit 
knowledge among units within the same geographical space or separated across 
continents adds value to any organization.    
What are the knowledge flow challenges within and between Marine corps units 
conducting pre-deployment training and executing relief in place operations?  
Nissen (2006) indicated that knowledge is characterized by its inertia.  
Knowledge clumps and according to von Hippel (1994) it’s sticky and thereby difficult to 
move about.  Snowden (2005) indicated that people always know more than what they 
can say and their knowledge must be facilitated, implying that knowledge is a human 
interactive phenomena.  The research has maintained that a great many attempts have 
been made at instantiating knowledge in IT systems (Housel & Bell, 2001 ), and many 
have failed because according to Nissen (2006) tacit knowledge flows are generally only 
possible to instantiate through simulation and expert systems.  Moreover instead of 
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instantiating knowledge in IT systems, the former World Bank Knowledge Management 
Program Director, Denning (2007), champions the narrative as a means of facilitating 
tacit knowledge flows; he is supported by the director of IBM's Cynefin Center in that 
respect (Snowden, 2005).  All the aforementioned sums up to the following:  tacit 
knowledge transfers do not occur on their own.    
As a result, the organization must facilitate these flows if they are to achieve the 
competitive advantages that Stewart (1999) espouses are required to survive in the new 
age economy.  With respect to the military, as presented in the research, it is not about 
achieving competitive advantage to improve the bottom line; it is about adapting faster 
than the enemy can.  It is about adhering to the tenets of Hayes-Roth (2006) in that the 
organism that evolves faster, learns faster, and incorporates the surviving successful traits 
into its new being faster, then maintains into a unique advantage.  The military 
organization maintains an unmatched degree of flexibility capable of flexing to the new 
emerging phenomena because it has refused to allow its knowledge in inventory to 
remain inert, clumpy, sticky or static in the minds of people.  This applies whether it is on 
the battlefield flexing to the varying mental states of a three block war, or whether it is 
NASA conducting brainstorming sessions among a collaborative group of 500 scientists.  
In order for these flows to occur, the primacy of two tenets maintain:  the people and the 
organization.    
Of all the services, the Marine Corps is best poised to exploit the sharing culture 
of its youthful members.  66% of the organization is under the age of 25, the youngest of 
all services; 24% are not even of legal age to drink and 13%are teenagers  (Marine Corps 
Community Services, 2007).  Social media usage scatter plots from a perceptions study 
among Naval Officers affirms that the younger the service member the more prolific the 
use of electronic social networks (Bennington & King, 2010).  From an individualistic 
perspective, the corps that comprises the Marine Corps has tremendous potential to 
exploit knowledge sharing through the use of social media.    
The Marine Corps as an organization is unmatched at performing its niche of 
combat duties; however it is far behind its sister services when it comes to knowledge 
management (Johnson, 2010).  Moreover, as observed in the Social Media Knowledge 
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Flow Facilitation Framework, the organization must promote knowledge sharing and 
motivate the composition of its organization to want to share that knowledge.  Lastly, as 
indicated in the framework, it must identify its knowledge flow goals. In the absence of 
the aforementioned three organizational responsibilities, knowledge flows between and 
within Marine Corps units remains a local phenomenon attributed to astute personnel 
recognizing the need to learn from one another.      
For example, in the absence of any forma l collaboration medium, the team 
leaders in the case study established a 411 frequency on their own accord in which they 
could air out their 'naïve' questions.  This medium although crude and rudimentary 
adhered to the four knowledge flow tenets of the framework.  It was a safe environment 
among team leaders, free of the ridicule, sarcasm, and higher up criticism that might 
accompany the naïve questions on a formal net.  Moreover, it was accessible to every 
team leader with a radio.  Furthermore, the team leaders were aware of where the 
knowledge was, who had it, and who was willing to share it.  Therefore a team leader 
might call upon a particular joint terminal air controller (JTAC) known for the ability to 
elegantly and efficiently develop a grid-reference-grid (GRG), while yet another query 
from the same source might go out to a second call sign known for maintaining an 
uncanny understanding of a particular coalition force culture.  Because this was a 411 
established by the JTAC community, the grass roots motivation observed in many of the 
commercial social media phenomena in Chapter III was also present here. All four 
knowledge flow tenets persisted in this situation; however, this was local emergence and 
not an organizational wide phenomena supported by infrastructure and strategy that 
strategically targeted the anthropological needs of its members in a way that both 
motivated them to share and supported them to share knowledge.    
How can social networking technologies be adapted to facilitate knowledge flows 
within and between Marine Corps Units?  
The Social Media Knowledge Facilitation Framework was created with the 
purpose of addressing how social media could be leveraged in any organization.  The 
knowledge management domains drawn from a collaborative study prompted by a Xerox 
initiative provide an initial set of considerations for a social media undertaking (Powers, 
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1999).  The very successful Eureka project associated with this study was only active in 
six of the ten domains (Powers, 1999), demonstrating that not all domains are required 
for success.  For example, fans of quantitative study might measure the value of 
knowledge before pursuing a social media initiative, while others may intuitively apply 
the knowledge model in the framework and determine qualitatively that the facilitation of 
the knowledge flows validates the effort.  The knowledge flow tenets described in the 
example of the 411 frequency are critical to the success of any social media endeavor 
meant to leverage the knowledge stores within its organization.  The structure depicted in 
the framework provides the tenets derived from the literature review and the practical 
application in the vignettes.  An organization can establish the top conditions but it must 
make the conditions for participation voluntary and allow for grass roots growth.  The 
Army has done a terrific job of providing structure, support, left and right lateral limits, 
while yet allowing its professional communities to freely engage.  Implementation of 
social media capabilities within the Marine Corps are further discussed in the 
recommendations below. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS   
Adhering to the impetus of the research, the following recommendations center on 
improvements to situational awareness, readiness, and productivity in the Marine Corps.  
Nonetheless, the fundamentals of the prescribed recommendations are inherently 
applicable to a wide variety of organizations that: are geographically dispersed; are goal 
or mission oriented; operate with limited resources; have untapped knowledge in 
inventory.  The private, public, and military examples of social media uses spanning the 
better half of a decade provide ready proof that realized benefits can be gained from a 
properly implemented knowledge facilitating social media initiative.  
1. Virtual Communities for Readiness and Productivity  
As pointed out in Chapter IV, virtual communities come in many flavors.  The 
type of virtual community selected much match the intended goal.  This follows the 
framework's recommendation of the organization identifying the knowledge flow goals.  
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The driving question in framing the organizational problem is:  ‘what knowledge flows is 
the organization attempting to facilitate and towards what purpose?’  This might be stated 
otherwise by referring to the embedded knowledge model in the framework.  Knowing 
what you know, can help determine knowing what you need to know, in order to 
accomplish the intended objective or mission.  This helps frame the type of virtual 
community desired.  
The virtual communities the Marine Corps can best leverage for improved 
readiness, productivity, and situation awareness include communities of purpose and 
professional forums.  As discussed in the case study, ANGLICO team leaders must 
develop interpersonal relationships with their supported unit in order to effectively 
integrate into the operational planning cycle and serve as competent advisors.  Doing so 
makes the team and the MAGTF Commander's assets much more effective.  It was 
argued that the early establishment of the liaison-supported unit relationship improved 
the ability of the unit to seamlessly embed themselves with the supported unit.  Adopting 
the Army definition of a community of purpose, this type of virtual community is 
purpose driven and for a set duration of time.  Within the construct of the example, the 
intent of a liaison virtual community would be to provide the means for the planned joint 
force supported unit to discover ANGLICO, learn how to leverage it into its operational 
planning, and establish rapport through the interaction with team leaders.  An alternative 
example is observed in the establishment of a community of purpose coming as a result 
of humanitarian disaster.  The trust issues coming from the lack of strong interpersonal 
ties are overcome through the establishment of a single identity that serves as a unifying 
banner during this time specific, purpose driven virtual community.  A commercial 
example is observed in the establishment of a community of purpose to solve a particular 
problem, as might be the case in a cyber defense community of purpose, or another may 
bring the collective knowledge in inventory to collaborate on a project.    
The second virtual community recommendation for the Marine Corps is in 
establishing professional forums that are structured, provided left and right lateral limits 
for participation, and are facilitated by role players that have some measure of actor 
centrality.  The conditions for such a site are set top down, but participation and growth 
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of the site is strictly voluntary.  Mentorship forums strictly linking company commanders 
or noncommissioned officers, as the Army has done, can serve as powerful tools to help 
shape the community through leadership and peer to peer mentoring.  The adoption of 
such a measure can be observed as the next level in the Marine Corps' mentorship 
program.  Referring to the failed midwives e-mail mentorship program presented in 
Chapter III, mentorship through a collective involved in synchronous communication is 
superior to one on one asynchronous mentorship.   
Lastly, a community can be established along functional lines.  For example, an 
electronics maintenance chief professional community can serve to leverage the 
collective knowledge of the group.  On the whole, productivity is increased through the 
facilitation of knowledge sharing and knowledge transfers.  This is analogous to the 
recommendations coming out of Cyber Shock Wave.  A forum, enhanced with the ability 
to access repositories of explicit knowledge and augmented with the ability for tacit 
knowledge sharing provides the means to gather best practices, innovate them, and make 
them even better practices.  The Army's BCKS has established functional forums along 
the lines described.  One such forum is LogNet that serves to bring together Army 
soldiers and civilian workers along functional lines  (U.S. Army, 2010).  NASA's 
Spacebook can be observed to be such a forum as well.    
As suggested in the ANGLICO case study, establishing forums that brings 
together the collective knowledge of a single unit or a group of similarly performing units 
can be tremendous value added.  As depicted in the hypothetical regimental command 
example with two sharply different performing battalions.  The knowledge across 
elements of a unit are not evenly distributed and as a result create pockets of knowledge 
gaps.  These knowledge gaps can be addressed in the same manner the Eureka project 
sought to address their knowledge gaps.  However a professional forum entwined with 
the means to leverage all manner of social media to enhance the transfer and sharing of 
knowledge is even much more powerful.     
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2. Narratives for Situational Awareness and Readiness  
Another recommendation for how social media can be leveraged to provide 
increased situational awareness comes in the form of narratives.  Deriving a sense of 
what is transpiring in a certain area of operations from a SITREP is difficult at best.  The 
document is devoid of the details that serve the informational needs of the lower levels of 
the hierarchy.  This follows the notion that there are different information needs along the 
hierarchy matching the varying levels of responsibilities (Hayes Roth, 2006).  
Establishing the means to provide narratives of different areas of operation from team 
leaders who have nurtured relationships during the course of the deployment can serve to 
better prepare units going into these areas.  Observing two young Army officers 
explaining, through a narrative on the BCKS site, the complexity of the relationships in 
their area of operations provides a unique dynamic sense of understanding and 
appreciation for the challenges being faced in their area relative to what could have been 
ascertained from a SITREP  (U.S. Army, 2010).  The latter example serves the needs of 
many levels because the interpretation of these narratives is personal.  It has been 
maintained that tacit knowledge is personalized knowledge, and the manner in which a 
visual narrative is interpreted is relative to the manner in which it is perceived.  
Therefore, a General visually interpreting the narrative derives different meaning than the 
young officer or SNCO observing the same storytelling episode.  As established in the 
literature review, codified knowledge like that in a SITREP is limited in its ability to 
share or transfer knowledge flows.  Although the latter is relevant and retains value, the 
marriage of the narrative with the formality of the SITREP can serve as supporting actors 
to each other.     
3. Social Media and Reliefs in Place  
Leveraging social media to address the challenges of units conducting turnovers 
with each other in the combat zone is another recommendation with powerful potential.  
Incorporating the above examples, virtual communities and narratives, and applying them 
with the specific purpose of facilitating a virtual right seat capability has the potential to 
generate momentum that can decrease the operational lull that naturally occurs as one 
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veteran unit is replaced with a new unit.  The Army has instituted such a virtual right seat 
capability within its BCKS.  Figure 15 lists the following objectives for its social media 
driven virtual right seat capability. 
 
Figure 15.   Virtual Right Seat Objectives (From BCKS) 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES  
Social media and its implementation to facilitate knowledge flows remains in its 
infancy.  Social media has been largely leveraged by federal agencies as public affairs 
tool.  The aim in additional research would be to continue furthering a plan for 
knowledge flow facilitating social media.  The research determined that social media 
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does indeed facilitate knowledge flows and that leveraged properly can levy tremendous 
gains.  With respect to the Marine Corps and other organizations lacking such a capacity, 
the specific aim in future research is in taking a concept of operations and developing an 
implementation plan.  Implementation would need to consider the use of social media on 
the unclassified and classified sites.  The Army's BCKS would be a good start in 
assessing how that has been addressed.    
During the course of this research, the Army's Battle Command Knowledge 
System came to light.  Further research may include assessing how well the Army's 
Battle Command Knowledge System has facilitated knowledge flows or how well it has 
done in meeting its objectives in order to determine if such a system should be mirrored.  
The research can be done in the form of surveys.  Or instead fans of quantitative analysis 
might look to analyzing the knowledge value added through the creation of professional 
forums like companycommand.mil.   
Technical research that feeds into a larger implementation plan could include a 
conduct of social network analysis.  The goal in such research would be to build 
taxonomy and propose where connections need to be made first and foremost in order to 
capitalize on knowledge flows.  Moreover, this can serve to map out structural holes.  
Snowden (2005) provides the background for why and how this could be beneficial in an 
implementation plan.   Another avenue of technical research might be in folksonomies 
and the phenomena of tagging.  Tagging is necessary for information to remain accessible 
in the long run.  Such work might be important to implementation.  Lastly, an alternate 
research approach might include an exploration into the new capabilities made available 
through Web 3.0 Social Semantic Web and how the paradigm shift associated with these 
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